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The present research examined the extent of desire for, and the likelihood of enacting, 
revenge as a function of the Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC; Kruglanski, 2004; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The studies herein aimed to more fully understand how 
low (vs. high) NFC individuals are able to refrain from acting on revenge impulses 
which they were expected to do through greater cognitive processing. Specifically, I 
demonstrate across four studies that high (vs. low)NFC individuals desire revenge to 
a greater extent as well as engage in more retributive behaviors. Study 2 showed that 
perspective taking and attributional reasoning are examples of additional processing 
engaged in by low (vs. high) NFC individuals, which augment the desire for 
forgiveness. Study 3 demonstrated that an induction of perspective taking leads to 
lesser revenge behavior and indeed eliminated the difference in retaliation between 
high and low NFC individuals. Study 4 conceptually replicated the relationship 
between the NFC and retaliation using situational mnipulations of high (vs. low) 
NFC. The present studies were unable to show that following a transgression, revenge 
  
(vs. forgiveness) is the most cognitively accessible option and were further unable to 
demonstrate that accessibility of revenge changes ov r time for high NFC individuals. 























ON THE CLOSED-MINDEDNESS OF REVENGE: MOTIVATED 













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fufillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 












Professor Dr. Arie Kruglanski, Chair 
Professor Dr. Michele Gelfand 
Professor Dr. Kevin O’Grady 
Professor Dr. Rebecca Ratner 























© Copyright by 



























I dedicate this dissertation to my loving and supportive family including my husband, 





I would like to thank the many dedicated undergraduate research assistants who 
carefully ran participants through the lab experiments, as well as Kristen Klein and 
Julie O’Brien who provided invaluable comments on earli r drafts of this manuscript.  
I would also like to thank my advisor, Dr. Arie Kruglanski, for his guidance 




Table of Contents 
 
Dedication ........................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................. iv 
 
List of Figures .................................................................................................... vi 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 
Revenge.......................................................................................................... 4 
Need for Closure ............................................................................................ 7 
Perspective Taking and the Need for Closure ........ .......................................... 12
 
Chapter 2: Overview of Research ................................................................... 16 
Overview of Theory and Research Predictions ...................................................... 16 
Overview of Studies ........................................................................................... 22 
 
Chapter 3: Study 1 ........................................................................................... 24 
Methods.............................................................................................................. 25 
Participants ............................................................................................... 25 
Procedure and Design ............................................................................. 25 
Results .......................................................................................................... 27 
Discussion .................................................................................................... 35 
 
Chapter 4: Study 2 ........................................................................................... 39 
Methods.............................................................................................................. 39 
Participants ............................................................................................... 39 
Procedures and Design ................................................................................... 40 
Results .......................................................................................................... 41 
Discussion .................................................................................................... 45 
 
Chapter 5:  Study 3 .......................................................................................... 50 
Methods.............................................................................................................. 51 
Participants ............................................................................................... 51 
Procedures and Design ................................................................................... 51 
Results .......................................................................................................... 53 
Discussion .................................................................................................... 58 
 
Chapter 6:  Study 4 .......................................................................................... 61 
Methods.............................................................................................................. 62 
Participants ............................................................................................... 62 
Procedures and Design ................................................................................... 62 
Results .......................................................................................................... 64 





Chapter 7:  General Discussion....................................................................... 70 
Support for Hypotheses...................................................................................... 71 
Interpreting Negative Results ...................................................................... 73 
Methodological Issues ................................................................................. 76 
Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions ..... ............................................ 77 
 
Chapter 8:  Conclusion..................................................................................... 83 
 
Appendix A ....................................................................................................... 84 
Appendix B ....................................................................................................... 85 
Appendix C ....................................................................................................... 86 
Appendix D ....................................................................................................... 87 
Appendix E ....................................................................................................... 88 
Appendix F........................................................................................................ 89 
 

































List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: (Study 1) NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the desire for 
revenge .............................................................................................. 29 
Figure 2: (Study 1) NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the desire for 
forgiveness ........................................................................................ 30 
Figure 3: (Study 1) NFC x Transgression condition  x Revenge/Forgiveness desires 
within-participant interaction ....................................................................... 31 
Figure 4: (Study 1) NFC x Transgression condition  x Time within-participant 
interaction on response time to revenge-related words ................................ 33 
Figure 5: (Study 1) NFC x Transgression condition  x Revenge-Forgiveness within-
participant interaction at Time 1 .................................................................. 34 
Figure 6: (Study 1) NFC x Transgression condition  x Revenge-Forgiveness within-
participant interaction at Time 2 .................................................................. 35 
Figure 7: (Study 2) NFC x Revenge/Forgiveness desires within-participant interaction
............................................................................................................ 43 
Figure 8: (Study 3) NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the extent of 
vengeful behavior............................................................................... 55 
Figure 9: (Study 3) NFC x Transgression condition x Perspective Taking condition 
interaction on the extent of vengeful behavior ............................................ 58 
Figure 10: (Study 4) NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the extent of 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
The act of taking revenge against someone who has committed an injustice has 
been contemplated across decades and disciplines, from Milton’s Paradise Lost o 
vengeance-related crimes examined in the criminal justice field (e.g., Kubrin & Weitzer, 
2003; Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2002) to current research in 
psychology.  Understanding revenge has significant implications; for example, the desire 
for retribution has been linked to up to 20% of homicides (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003) and 
from 1974 to 2000, more than 60% of U.S. school shootings occurred due to motivations 
for revenge (Vossekuil et al., 2002). Further, Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006) found 
that desire for vengeance is one reason cited by individuals who join terrorist 
organizations. Revenge and aggression more generally have also been associated with 
factors experienced by most people on a regular basis, such as frustration and anger (see 
Baumeister & Boden, 1998, for an overview).  
Despite the prevalence of factors that often give ris  to revenge and aggression, 
aggressive acts are relatively rare (Baumeister & Boden, 1998).  Thus, it is important to 
identify the factors that make revenge following a transgression more or less likely.  
Expressly, who is more likely to refrain from engaging in revenge and why? The present 
research aims to address this question as it relates to the motivation of the Need for 
Cognitive Closure (NFC; Kruglanski, 2004; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
One reason that individuals engage in retributive acts is because it offers adaptive 
benefits (McCullough, 2008), specifically deterring future aggression (Allred, 1999; 
Brown, 1968; Crombag, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2003; Kim, Smith, & Brigham, 1998; 




been suggested to have arisen through evolutionary selection pressures (McCullough et 
al., 2010). This is so because a transgression reveals that one is vulnerable to being 
harmed. Thus, one may argue that a transgression establishes a precedent and hence 
"opens the door" to future wrong-doings by the original transgressor and others. In a 
sense, a transgression may be thought of as an implic t question asked by the 
transgressor. Namely, he or she is asking "Can I harm you? To what extent? Will you 
fight back?"1 Revenge is arguably an answer or reply to the transgression; indeed, 
revenge is often defined as a response to a previous aggressive act (Stuckless & 
Goranson, 1992; Allred, 1999). Research further provides evidence that revenge can 
specifically “answer” that one will not accept harm, which it does by deterring future 
aggression from the same perpetrator (Allred, 1999; Crombag et al., 2003) as well as 
from third-party witnesses (Brown, 1968; Kim et al., 1998).  
A transgression, then, representing a question (which begs answering), may be 
viewed as a lack of closure. Thus, individuals may be particularly motivated to enact 
revenge against transgressors as a means of answerig the question and thus achieving 
closure. In support of this notion, Boyatzi (2011) found that individuals higher in the 
NFC desire revenge to a greater extent after a transg ession than individuals with lower 
levels of the NFC. The question, therefore, is why individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC 
desire revenge less, especially given that revenge offers adaptive benefits. 
                                                
1 This is not to say that transgressions occur because individuals harm others for the sake of enjoyment; 
rather, given the social norm that individuals often act in their own self interest (Ratner & Miller, 2001), 
injustices likely occur as a consequence. For example, stealing one’s wallet is for the gain of the thief, not 
the loss of the owner; claiming a colleague’s idea as one’s own may be to advance one’s career, not 
undermine the colleague’s performance; and lying to a friend about having plans for the weekend may be to 




I argue that all individuals who are the victim of an injustice will experience an 
initial urge to get revenge. Considering the adaptive value of revenge, it would follow 
that after a transgression, revenge should be highly salient. In fact, researchers speculate 
that one’s first impulse following a transgression is to engage in negative behaviors, such 
as revenge (McCullough, 2001). Individuals high in the NFC, motivated to achieve quick 
and lasting closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), may “seize” and “freeze” on revenge 
as the most accessible option whereas low NFC individuals may go beyond the initial 
impulse and consider other options.  
Individuals low in the NFC, therefore, may choose to “answer the question” in a 
different way, such as with forgiveness, which may appear more reasonable upon further 
consideration (McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). These individuals may weigh the 
pros and cons of several different options, such as t e costs associated with revenge 
(Boon, Alibhai, & Deveau, 2011) and the potential benefits of forgiveness, including 
preserving the relationship with the transgressor, if ne existed (McCullough, Rachal, 
Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 1998). Indiviuals low (vs. high) in the NFC 
may also reflect on the transgressor’s perspective and/or may consider additional 
information when judging how to respond (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994). Thus, it is 
possible that low (vs. high) NFC individuals do notengage in revenge because they 
override the dominant response of revenge and engag in more elaborative processing of 
the transgression, perhaps leading to an alternative response. I hypothesize that increasing 
one’s motivation to take additional information into account, through perspective taking 




the importance of the NFC in determining whether or n t an individual will override the 
revenge impulse and engage in additional cognitive processing of the transgression. 
Revenge 
Enacting revenge after a perceived injustice is an innate impulse that strongly 
influences behavior (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992; Marongui & Newman, 1987). There is 
general consensus that revenge is prompted by a prior harmful act by another (Stuckless 
& Goranson, 1992; Allred, 1999). Vengeance is described as a functional action 
(McCullough et al., 2010) serving a variety of purposes including: reinstating moral order 
in society (Lerner, 1980; McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick & Johnson, 2001), validating 
one’s moral standards (Vidmar, 2002), and reinstating the balance of power (Crombag et 
al., 2003; Frijda, 1994). Revenge can further protect one’s belief in a just world, restore 
justice (McCullough et al., 2001; Vidmar & Miller, 1980), and re-establish one’s self-
image (Miller, 2001) and self-esteem (Crombag et al., 2003).  
It is important to distinguish revenge from other ngative interpersonal behaviors 
as it differs from related constructs in several meaningful ways. Aggression has been 
defined as intentional harm to another person (Berkowitz, 1974), which does not 
necessitate prior interaction between them, whereas revenge is focused on a specific 
person because s/he has previously done harm to the individual (Stuckless & Goranson, 
1992; Allred, 1999). Incivility is defined as “low intensity deviant behavior with 
ambiguous intent to harm the target…” and thus may or may not be enacted for the 
purpose of injury to the target; however, revenge is “an action in response to some 
perceived harm or wrongdoing by another party that is intended to inflict damage, injury, 




p. 53, emphases added). The distinction between revenge and punishment is less clear. 
Returning to Aquino et al.’s (2001) definition of revenge, “An action in response to some 
perceived harm or wrongdoing by another party that is intended to inflict damage, injury, 
discomfort, or punishment on the party judged responsible” (p. 53, emphasis dded), it is 
seen that the terms revenge and punishment are often used interchangeably. Indeed many 
social and organizational inquiries into revenge us both terms to describe the act of 
retaliation (e.g., Allred, 1999; Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008).  
The Aquino et al. (2001) definition of revenge used h rein is broadly accepted in 
the literature (Aquino, Tripp & Bies, 2006; Bies & Tripp, 2004; Bies, Trip & Kramer, 
1997; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Carlsmith et al., 2008; Frijda, 1994; Kaiser, Vick & 
Major, 2004; McCullough, 2008; Raver & Barling 2008; Shuman & Ross, 2010; 
Stuckless, Ford & Vitelli, 1995; Stuckless & Goranso , 1992; Yoshimura, 2007); 
however, many of these authors as well as other scholars (e.g., Bradfield & Aquino, 
1999; Cialdini, Green, & Rusch, 1992; Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004; 
Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011; Helm, Bonoma, & Tedeschi, 1972; McCullough et 
al., 2001; Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002; 
Youngs, 1986) clarify that revenge is a type of negative reciprocity and can be viewed as 
an expression of the negative reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 1960). Thus although revenge 
differs from other negative interpersonal behaviors such as aggression and incivility, it is 
not differentiated from (negative) reciprocity. 
Revenge as instinctual. Researchers (McCullough, 2001; McCullough et al., 
2001; McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997) generally 




immediately following a transgression and that it must be overridden by the victim in 
order for him or her to move past the incident. McCullough and colleagues argue that 
individuals are “at least initially” motivated to react to transgressions with negative 
behaviors such as revenge, but that individuals must “counteract or modulate” the 
impulse to seek revenge in order to choose an altern tive response option, such as 
forgiveness (McCullough, 2001, p. 194; McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 
1998; McCullough et al., 1997).  
Overriding the revenge impulse. DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, and Gailliot 
(2007) provide empirical support for the idea that following a transgression, one’s initial 
impulse is to get revenge. In particular, they highlight how the amount of one’s resources 
impacts the extent to which he or she engages in revenge, showing that participants 
whose self-regulatory resources were depleted were less able to inhibit aggressive 
impulses. Specifically, some participants were depleted from earlier acts of self-control 
such as refraining from eating a donut or diverting o e’s gaze away from words on a 
screen while watching a video. These participants subsequently behaved more 
aggressively toward the person who had insulted them. Participants who were not 
depleted, such as those who had abstained from eating a less tempting food (a radish) or 
who were not given attention-diverting instructions, acted less vengeful when insulted.  
The authors argued that depleted participants were unable to inhibit the revenge 
impulse that arose from being insulted whereas non-depleted participants were more 
successful at overriding the impulse and therefore behaved with less retaliation. Although 




from a transgression, this idea was not directly tested. The present research will address 
this gap in Study 1.  
Provided that revenge is arguably the most salient option after an individual 
experiences an injustice, and consequently is equally accessible to everyone, one must 
inquire why high and low NFC individuals respond differently to transgressions. 
Individuals high in the NFC appear to choose the dominant response of revenge while 
individuals low in the NFC seemingly do not (Boyatzi, 2011). An examination of the 
NFC construct provides understanding of why this may occur.  
The Need for Closure 
The NFC is a type of motivated cognition that affects knowledge and judgment 
formation; specifically, it is a general inclination to seek closure via any answer or 
judgment (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 199 ; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  For a person high in the NFC, any conclusion is seen as 
preferable to experiencing ambiguity or uncertainty. The NFC is particularly sensitive to 
the saliency of information because it is characterized by “seizing” and “freezing” 
tendencies such that an individual high (vs. low) in the NFC seizes on the most salient 
option to achieve closure quickly and freezes on that decision in order to prevent future 
losses of closure. 
Provided that revenge offers adaptive benefits in facilitating survival, it has been 
argued that it is the most salient or accessible option following a transgression 
(McCullough, 2001; McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough et 
al., 1997). Therefore, individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC should be more likely to seek 




closure (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 199 ; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Choosing the most accessible response, revenge, allows 
one to satisfy the need of urgency, thus achieving closure more quickly as compared to 
assessing different response options (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) which are less 
initially accessible than revenge, such as forgiveness. Revenge may also provide 
permanent closure and specifically prevent future losses of closure (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996) because it can prevent future transges ions (Allred, 1999; Crombag et 
al., 2003). Although intuition may support the notion that revenge is the most dominant 
and accessible response after a transgression and thus is seized and frozen on by high 
NFC individuals, the idea remains unexplored empirically. The present research will test 
this assumption in Study 1.  
NFC and the Dominant Response. There is a considerable body of evidence 
showing that individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC are less likely to seize and freeze on 
salient options when forming judgments or making decisions.2 For instance, several 
studies to date have examined the effect of the NFC(or related states, such as a lack of 
cognitive resources) on stereotype use in judgments (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; 
Brewer, 1988; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Bodenhausen, 1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), 
for example, found that low (vs. high) NFC participants judged stereotypic groups as 
                                                
2 All research on the NFC cited herein focused on high (vs. low) NFC as the group of interest; however, as 
Kruglanski and Webster (1996) state, “Effects of the motivation for closure are assumed to be monotonic 
along the continuum. By this assumption, the motivational effects should be directionally similar for any 
pair of points on the continuum: A higher (vs. lower) degree of the need for closure should effect a higher 
or lower degree of some phenomenon, irrespective of the points' specific locations. Thus, comparing low
and high need for closure conditions should yield effects directionally similar to those involved in 
comparing high and low need to avoid closure conditions. Evidence reviewed in subsequent sections 
consistently supports this assumption” (p. 264). Thus, the results described in the current paper extrapolated 




more variable and less homogenous on a given trait. Thus, low (vs. high) NFC 
participants refrained from seizing on the stereotype and using it as a basis for judgments. 
Indeed, the authors commented that participants low (vs. high) in the NFC “seem to be 
more open to unexpected, disturbing information” (p. 262). 
Additional evidence can be found in Kruglanski’s and Pierro’s (2008) research, in 
which the authors examined how accessible cognitive sch mas of one’s significant other 
may be transferred to other individuals as a functio  of the NFC. The results showed that 
low (vs. high) NFC individuals were able to inhibit the activated mental representation of 
their significant other when forming an impression of a new person who resembled the 
significant other in some way. Specifically, they made fewer errors when identifying 
previously-presented descriptors of the new individual and they exhibited a smaller 
transference effect.  
A final example of low (vs. high) NFC individuals’ ability to override a salient 
construct is contained in Webster-Nelson, Klein andIrvin’s (2003) study on perspective 
taking. The results show that low (vs. high) NFC participants exhibited a greater ability to 
take a student’s perspective when it was different from their own. In other words, 
participants low (vs. high) in the NFC transcended their own perspective in order to 
understand the perspective of the other student.  
In conclusion, the literature supports the idea that low (vs. high) NFC individuals 
are able to override the situationally-dominant response. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
to predict that after a transgression, low NFC individuals will counteract the accessibility 




NFC, due to the high accessibility of revenge after a wrong-doing, but they may be more 
likely to exercise the necessary restraint to overcome this early impulse. 
Low (vs. high) NFC individuals may override the accessibility of vengeance 
following a transgression, yet one must inquire how they proceed in their decision-
making process regarding how to respond to the transgression. While they do not have 
the motivations of achieving closure quickly and permanently, which high NFC 
individuals achieve by seizing and freezing, it is unlikely that low NFC individuals never 
achieve closure when making judgments (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). In other words, 
it is a logical conclusion that in most cases, low NFC individuals (eventually) come to a 
decision about how to respond to the transgression. I argue that the decision is often 
arrived at following more elaborative cognitive processing than that engaged in by 
individuals high in the NFC. The relationship between the NFC and extent of information 
processing in decision making is discussed below. 
NFC and Extent of Information Processing. I propose that in addition to 
counteracting dominant responses, low (vs. high) NFC individuals engage in additional 
information processing in the course of judgment formation; indeed, there is substantial 
support in prior work for the idea that the NFC is negatively associated with degree of 
information processing. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) state that “at a minium, the 
seizing and freezing mechanism implies a reduced extent of information processing under 
a heightened need for closure. The speeded-up relianc  on early cues implied by seizing 
and the truncation of further exploration due to freezing suggest that individuals under a 
high (vs. low) need for closure should consider less vidence before forming a judgment” 




extensive processing from occurring. There is also support for the notion that the NFC is 
negatively related to the extent to which one engages in and takes pleasure in the act of 
thinking (i.e., the need for cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1994). Thus, individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC engage in more cognition, as well as 
enjoy it to a greater extent (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994). 
The literature further provides ample empirical evid nce that low (vs. high) NFC 
individuals process more information when making decisions. Webster and Kruglanski 
(1994) in particular provide converging evidence that low (vs. high) NFC individuals do 
not utilize initial cues when forming judgments but rather go on to consider larger 
amounts of information. For example, individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC requested 
significantly more pages of information when making hiring decisions (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). This act of requesting more 
information has been explicitly described as “delibrate and thorough processing of 
information” (Webster-Nelson et al., 2003, p. 38).  
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) also found that low (vs. high) NFC participants 
exhibited less of a correspondence bias; that is, they formed judgments using a greater 
amount of information (concerning the situation) and did not rely solely on the 
individual’s actions. The correspondence bias has been argued to be directly related to 
information processing; Webster and Kruglanski (1994) and others (Winter & Uleman, 
1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985) suggest that making personality inferences, at 
least in Western cultures, is generally automatic and unintentional whereas adjusting 




Other research has examined resistance to persuasion and found that when 
exposed to prior information, low (vs. high) NFC participants were more willing to 
consider alternative options (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). There are many additional examples in the lierature which demonstrate that more 
information is considered by individuals low (vs. hig ) in the NFC. These examples 
include low (vs. high) NFC individuals displaying an openness to persuasion by partners 
(Kruglanski et al., 1993), avoidance of stereotypes (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; 
Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Dijksterhuis et al., 1996), and greater acceptance of opinion 
deviates in a group (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991).  
Perspective Taking and the NFC 
Thus, in conjunction, the research literature supports the notion that low (vs. high) 
NFC individuals are better able to override dominant responses (e.g., revenge) and 
engage in more elaborate processing when making decisions (e.g., about how to respond 
to a transgression). An example of these processes that hould directly impact 
interpersonal processes is perspective taking. Perspective taking and its kindred-construct 
empathy have been defined as “the imaginative transporting of oneself into the thinking, 
feeling, and acting of another and so structuring the world as he or she does” (Dymond, 
1949, p. 127).  
It has long been contended that one’s ability to engage in perspective taking is 
important for a range of interpersonal behaviors (Higgins, 1981; Mead, 1934; Piaget, 
1932; Smith, 1759/1976), including altruism (Batson, 1991), cooperation (Batson & 
Moran, 1999), and, especially relevant to the present paper, conflict resolution (Galinsky, 




has been associated with social disorders such as autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995) as well as 
negative interpersonal responding behaviors such as arrogance, inconsideration, and 
aggression (Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, & Signo, 1994).  
Within a transgression context, engaging in perspective taking has been shown to 
decrease punishment of the wrongdoer. Kogut (2011) found that after reading a 
hypothetical transgression, taking the transgressor’s perspective decreased anger as well 
as suggested punishment. Other researchers (e.g., Batanova & Loukas, 2011) also found 
support that perspective taking of the other individual is negatively associated with 
aggression in a longitudinal study of early adolescents. Thus, it would seem to follow that 
perspective taking should lead to a decrease in revenge behaviors as well; indeed, this 
proposition has preliminary empirical support (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011).  
Research supports the notion that perceiving the world through one’s own 
perspective is automatic (Galinsky et al., 2008); thus it is unsurprising that taking another 
person’s perspective requires effortful and controlled cognitive processing (Davis, 
Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). For example, Davis et al. (1996) found that individuals 
who experienced cognitive load exhibited a significantly lower ability to take another’s 
perspective. As cognitive load is a common way of manipulating the NFC via situational 
constraints (Kruglanski, 2004), it follows that the NFC and perspective taking ability 
should be negatively related to some extent. As previously mentioned, Webster-Nelson et 
al. (2003) have provided initial evidence for this effect.  
In summary, perspective taking may be considered on way in which low NFC 
individuals engage in greater cognitive processing. Specifically, taking another’s 




decisions. Thus, perspective taking may moderate the relationship between the NFC and 
desire for revenge such that without perspective taking instructions, high and low NFC 
individuals act as they normally do (i.e., high (vs. low) NFC individuals engage in greater 
revenge), and with perspective taking instructions, i dividuals high in the NFC should 
engage in more perspective taking and thus act moresimilarly to low NFC individuals, 
enacting less retaliation.  
While perspective taking may be regarded as a type of cognitive processing of a 
transgression, other forms are plausible. Items from the NFC scale (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994) provide insight into alternative methods of additional cognitive 
processing in which low (more so than high) NFC individuals may be likely to engage. 
Examples include “Even after I’ve made my mind about something, I am always eager to 
consider a different opinion,” “When thinking about a problem, I consider as many 
different options on the issue as possible,” and “When considering most conflict 
situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right” (emphasis added). After a 
transgression, low (vs. high) NFC individuals may thoroughly consider alternative 
responses, they may review the pros and cons of allpossible response options to the 
injustice, and/or they may engage in perspective taking to understand why the 
transgressor committed the wrongdoing. Thus, high NFC individuals may be motivated 
to reduce ambiguity caused by the transgression as quickly as possible by seizing and 
freezing on revenge as the most accessible option and consequently be more likely to 
desire and engage in revenge. By contrast, individuals low in the NFC may be motivated 
to consider alternative response options and contemplate the transgressor’s perspective, 




The present investigation will test these notions by exploring the extent of 
perspective taking engaged in by low (vs. high) NFC individuals following a 
transgression (Study 2) as well as a manipulation of perspective taking as it relates to 
extent of revenge behaviors (Study 3). The perspective taking manipulation in Study 3 is 
intended to encourage high NFC individuals to act similarly to low NFC individuals. 
Specifically, it is expected that in the perspective taking (vs. neutral) condition, they will 
process the transgression more fully by considering how the transgressor decided to act in 



















Chapter 2: Overview of Research 
Overview of Theory and Research Predictions 
 The purpose of the present studies is to examine the accessibility of revenge after 
a transgression and to more fully explore how low (vs. high) NFC individuals are able to 
counteract or override the accessibility of revenge and engage in more elaborative 
cognitive processing of the transgression. Specifically, I investigate whether revenge is 
the most cognitively accessible option following a transgression for all individuals 
regardless of their level of the NFC. This hypothesis is based on the notion that revenge 
serves evolutionarily-adaptive benefits such as deterring future transgressions (Allred, 
1999; Crombag et al., 2003), discouraging an aggresso  from harming the individual in 
the future (Diamond, 1977), and deterring other potential aggressors by signaling that one 
will not passively endure harm (Brown, 1968; Kim et al., 1998). Therefore, I expect the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will respond more quickly to revenge-related words 
after being presented with a transgression (vs. not). 
I propose that since a transgression illustrates that one is vulnerable to harm, it 
acts as a question posed by the transgressor to thevic im regarding whether the 
transgressor can “get away with it.” Revenge is often defined as a response to a previous 
aggressive act (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992; Allred, 1999) whereby it “answers” that one 
will not accept harm. Therefore, a transgression, inviting a question (whether or not one 
would accept harm), may be viewed as a lack of closure. Individuals, especially those 
high (vs. low) in the NFC, should be particularly motivated to enact revenge against 




Seizing and freezing on revenge fulfills the urgency and permanency motivations of high 
NFC individuals in that seizing on the most salient option (revenge) will provide quicker 
closure than if the individual took the time to consider all options thoroughly; 
furthermore, revenge provides lasting closure by preventing future acts of aggression 
toward the individual (Allred, 1999; Crombag et al., 2003). While Boyatzi (2011) found a 
significant positive relationship between the NFC and desire for revenge, the present 
investigation aims to extend this finding by eliminati g the alternative hypotheses that a) 
higher (vs. lower) NFC individuals are more aggressive in general and b) that this 
relationship holds only for desire for revenge and not for behavioral retaliation. Thus, I 
expect the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC will desire and engage in 
revenge to a greater extent following an injustice, whereas no differences will 
exist following a neutral experience. 
Whereas high NFC individuals arguably seize and freeze on revenge, low NFC 
individuals appear to counteract the accessibility of revenge and engage in additional 
cognitive processing of the transgression. It is expected that time is necessary for 
individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC to override the saliency of revenge and proceed 
with the more elaborate processing; therefore, the acc ssibility of the revenge construct 
should change over time. Measuring the accessibility of revenge immediately following a 
transgression (i.e., without allowing any time to pass) should confirm its equal level of 
accessibility for everyone, while measuring accessibility of vengeance after a period of 




individuals. Accessibility of forgiveness will also be measured at both time points to 
allow for comparisons with accessibility of revenge. Thus, I expect the following: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be an interaction between time and the NFC such that at 
time 1, both high and low NFC individuals will respond equally quickly to 
revenge-related words while at time 2, low (vs. high) NFC individuals will 
respond more slowly to revenge-related words.  
 Much research (e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Webster et al., 1996) shows 
that individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC engage in more extensive information 
processing in the course of forming judgments. Specifically, they consider a greater 
amount of information before making a decision. Forexample, when making hiring 
decisions regarding employment candidates, low NFC individuals requested more 
information about the candidates than high NFC individuals (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). Further, individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC are more open to others’ opinions 
and to persuasive attempts (Kruglanski et al., 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found that low (vs. high) NFC participants, while acting 
as jury members, shifted their verdict to a greater extent to be more in line with another’s 
opinion even after being provided a full legal analysis. Additionally, the previously-noted 
sample items from the NFC scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) underscore the 
motivations of low (vs. high) NFC individuals to consider both sides in a conflict and to 
review all possible options before forming a judgment. In the present context, the greater 
amount of information processing should correspond t  a greater numbers of thoughts 
about the transgression and a greater amount of time spent processing the injustice, as 




low) NFC individuals are expected to seize and freeze on revenge, I suggest that they 
should have more thoughts about revenge and fewer thoughts about alternative response 
options; the number of revenge-related thoughts then may mediate the relationship 
between the NFC and revenge. Therefore, I expect th following: 
Hypothesis 4a: Low (vs. high) NFC individuals will have a greater number of 
thoughts after the transgression. 
Hypothesis 4b: Low (vs. high) NFC individuals will spend a greater amount of 
time processing the transgression. 
Hypothesis 5: Low (vs. high) NFC individuals will have more varied thoughts 
after the transgression. Specifically, low (vs. high) NFC individuals will have 
thoughts that relate to a wider variety of response options to the transgression. 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between the NFC and revenge will be mediated by 
the extent of elaboration in the additional processing. Specifically, the amount of 
revenge related thoughts will mediate the NFC-revenge association. 
 I am proposing that in order to counteract the accessibility of vengeance following 
a transgression, low (vs. high) NFC individuals engage in subsequent elaborative 
cognitive processing of the event. Contemplating why the transgression occurred, such as 
through perspective taking, may be one example of how individuals low (vs. high) in the 
NFC employ additional cognitive processing. Therefor , I expect the following: 
Hypothesis 7: Low (vs. high) NFC individuals will have a greater number of 
perspective taking thoughts when processing the transgression. 
 There exists initial evidence for the negative relationship between the NFC and 




higher NFC) was found to interfere with the (laborious) work of perspective taking. 
Therefore, under a task designed to increase perspective taking, high NFC individuals 
should engage in additional cognitive processing, acting more like low NFC individuals 
typically do, and thus engage in revenge to a lesser ext nt. Therefore, I expect the 
following: 
Hypothesis 8: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between the NFC 
and revenge such that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC will engage in 
greater revenge when not provided with perspective taking instructions after a 
transgression, but that when participants are instruc ed to consider the 
transgressor’s perspective, there will be no difference between high and low NFC 
participants in the likelihood of engaging in reveng  behaviors. 
While Boyatzi (2011) found a consistent relationship between the NFC and desire 
for revenge and Studies 1-3 of the present investigation aim to replicate and extend this 
effect, no studies to date have replicated the NFC-revenge relationship using a situational 
manipulation of the NFC.  It is expected that choosing alternatives to revenge requires 
refraining from the initial revenge impulse and engaging in more elaborative cognitive 
processing of the transgression. Given that individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC are 
better able to inhibit the dominant response (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Brewer, 
1988; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Bodenhausen, 1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Webster-
Nelson et al., 1993; Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008) and are more 
likely to engage in greater cognitive processing (e. ., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; 
Brewer, 1988; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Bodenhausen, 1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 




that lowering (vs. enhancing) one’s NFC should lead to less engagement in revenge. 
Therefore, I expect the following: 
Hypothesis 9: Lowering (vs. enhancing) one’s NFC through a situational 
manipulation should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of engaging in revenge 
behaviors following a transgression, whereas after a neutral experience, 





















Overview of Studies 
I tested my predictions in a series of four studies. Study 1 utilized a transgression 
vignette and a measure of the desire for revenge. It also included a reaction time measure 
of revenge-related and forgiveness-related words. In Study 1, I sought to show the effect 
of a transgression on response time to revenge-related words (Hypothesis 1).  
Additionally, this study aimed to extend the positive association between the NFC and 
desire for revenge by including a neutral control condition (Hypothesis 2). Study 1 
further examined the effect of time and NFC on respon e time to revenge-related and 
forgiveness-related words (Hypothesis 3).  
Study 2 also employed a hypothetical transgression and a measure of desire for 
revenge (Hypothesis 2). This study examined the possible elaborative processing that low 
(vs. high) NFC individuals engage in to override thaccessibility of revenge by exploring 
their thoughts that occur after a transgression, attempting to demonstrate that low (vs. 
high) NFC individuals have more thoughts following a transgression (Hypothesis 4a), 
spend more time engaging in information processing of the injustice (Hypothesis 4b), and 
have more thoughts related to perspective taking (Hypothesis 7). Study 2 also tested if 
individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC have thoughts about a larger set of response options 
(Hypothesis 5) and if the number of revenge thoughts mediates the relationship between 
the NFC and revenge (Hypothesis 6). 
Study 3 influenced the additional processing normally engaged in by low (vs. 
high) NFC individuals by encouraging perspective taking. Specifically, in Study 3 I 
attempted to demonstrate that encouraging individuals to consider the perspective of the 




processing of the transgression and consequently to less revenge behaviors (Hypothesis 
8). Study 3 included a transgression experience and a behavioral measure of revenge, 
both operationalized through a dictator game (Hypothesis 2). This study also employed a 
perspective-taking condition (vs. neutral condition) following the transgression. It further 
included a measure of accessibility of revenge-related (i.e., aggression) words through a 
word completion task (Hypotheses 1 and 3).  
In Study 4, I attempted to demonstrate the relationship between the NFC and 
revenge can be replicated with inductions of high (vs. low) NFC. Whereas Studies 1-3 
used an individual difference measure of NFC, Study 4 manipulated the NFC 
situationally. Thus, the present study investigated more directly the hypothesis that 
lowering of participants’ NFC should lead to less retaliatory behaviors and augmenting 
the NFC would enhance the tendency to seek revenge (Hypothesis 9). Study 4 employed 
similar procedures as Study 3 including using a dictator game to manipulate a 
transgression and the word completion task to measur  the accessibility of revenge-
related words (Hypotheses 1 and 3). This study also examined the possible elaborative 
processing that low (vs. high) NFC individuals engage in following a transgression 











Chapter 3: Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to assess the accessibility of revenge as a response to 
a transgression. This study directly tested the assumption that due to revenge’s 
evolutionary adaptability, it is the most cognitively accessible option after an individual 
experiences an injustice. Additionally, this study measured the accessibility of revenge-
related words and forgiveness-related words at two time points, the first immediately 
after the transgression, and the second after some time had elapsed. The purpose of 
measuring accessibility over time was to test the hypothesis that low (more so than high) 
NFC individuals engage in additional cognitive processing of the transgression, which 
may lead to less accessibility of revenge at time 2 b cause they are considering other 
options, such as forgiveness. Alternatively, I assume that revenge is a cognitively 
accessible response and that it is seized and frozen n by more by high (vs. low) NFC 
individuals and thus for these individuals, revenge should remain equally accessible 
across time. There is limited prior research (McCullough et al., 2003) on the temporal 
unfolding of revenge and forgiveness motivations which previously were examined over 
a period of several weeks. Specifically, McCullough et al. (2003) investigated the 
temporal unfolding of forgiveness through a model incorporating desires for revenge, 
forgiveness, and avoidance at five time points. Thepresent investigation contributes by 
examining a much shorter time span and investigatin the role of the NFC on 
accessibility of revenge and forgiveness; it is expected that differences in accessibility 
should be found even after a very short time as a function of the NFC.  
Further, Study 1 tests the alternative hypothesis that the positive association 








Participants were 98 undergraduate psychology studen s (14 men and 84 women) 
from a large university with a mean age of 19.34 years who participated in the study in 
exchange for course credit. 
Procedure and Design 
Participants were told that the researcher was interes d in looking into the effect 
of individual differences on decision making and that the study involved several 
questionnaires and computer tasks. 
Study 1 employed a 2 (transgression: present and absent) x 2 (time: 1 and 2) x 2 
(reaction time: revenge- and forgiveness-related words) design with a continuous 
measurement of the NFC. Transgression condition was a between-participant factor and 
time and reaction time were within-participant factors. Gender produced no significant 
main effects or interactions, so it will not be mentio ed further. 
Participants were given the 14-item short version of the NFC scale (Pierro & 
Kruglanski, 2006; α = .80, see Appendix A) and responded to all items on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly agree). They were randomly assigned 
to either a transgression condition or control condition during which they read a vignette 
describing a transgression or a neutral story, respectively (see Appendices B and C). The 
transgression vignette describes an intentional act of wrongdoing which was intended to 




Immediately following the vignette, participants completed the first of two lexical 
decision tasks on a computer; these were designed to measure response latency to 
revenge-related, forgiveness-related, neutral and no words (see Appendix D). This partly 
constituted the measurement of the dependent variable for tests of the hypotheses that 
revenge is the most cognitively accessible option following a transgression (vs. no 
transgression; Hypothesis 1) and that the accessibility of revenge-related words will vary 
as a function of the NFC and time (Hypothesis 3).  
Participants were instructed to judge a target stimulus as a word or nonword as 
quickly as possible. A fixation point was marked by an “X” which appeared in the center 
of the screen before every target. The target appeared in pale yellow against a black 
background in the center of the screen and remained o  the screen for 2000 ms. Targets 
consisted of revenge-related words (e.g., retaliation, payback), forgiveness-related words 
(e.g., excuse, mistake), neutral words (e.g., hence, while), and nonwords (e.g., abreac, 
skring). All participants were asked to judge the same targets which included 10 revenge-
related words, 10 forgiveness-related words, 10 neutral words, and 20 nonwords, all 
randomly presented. Forgiveness targets were taken from Nelson, McEvoy and 
Schreiber’s (1998) free association library and all revenge and forgiveness targets were 
pretested by the researcher. Only correct responses were used in subsequent analyses as is 
standard practice (see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, 1990) and all 
responses which took longer than 2000 ms were eliminated (see Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000).  
The lexical decision task was followed by a neutral task that did not require much 




consider the transgression and decide how to respond. Specifically, it was expected that 
during this period of time, low NFC participants, more so than high NFC participants, 
would engage in additional processing of the transgression. Participants then completed 
the second lexical decision task measuring reaction time to the revenge-related, 
forgiveness-related, neutral and nonwords.  
Following the second lexical decision task, the Transgression-Related 
Interpersonal Motivations Inventory, 18-item version (TRIM-18, McCullough et al., 
2006) was completed (revenge subscale: α = .82; forgiveness subscale: α = .89). The 
TRIM measures hypothetical reactions to the perpetrator of an injustice. Items include 
revenge-related actions such as “I’ll make him/her pay” and “I’m going to get even,” as 
well as benevolence items such as “Despite what he/she did, I want us to have a positive 
relationship again” and “Even though his/her actions hurt me, I have goodwill for 
him/her.” Participants responded to all items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). This was followed by the Aggression Questionnaire 
(Buss & Perry, 1992; α = .87) which was used to control for trait aggression; participants 
responded to all items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely uncharacteristic of me to 
5 = Extremely characteristic of me). Participants also completed a demographic 
questionnaire. After completing the survey, participants were thoroughly debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Results 
 To test Hypothesis 1, for which I predicted that participants in the transgression 
(vs. no transgression) condition will have faster reaction times to revenge-related words 




on reaction time to revenge-related words. The results how that individuals presented 
with a transgression (vs. no transgression) did not respond more quickly to revenge-
related words (t 96) = .48, p = .632), thus Hypothesis 1 is not supported. However, a 
manipulation check of the transgression manipulation shows that individuals presented 
with a transgression (vs. no transgression) desired a greater amount of revenge (M = 2.73, 
SD = .84 vs. M = 2.32, SD = .69, respectively; t(96) = 2.59, p = .011). 
To test Hypothesis 2, I conducted a multiple regression analysis with the NFC as 
a continuous predictor, transgression condition as a dichotomous predictor, and the NFC 
x Transgression condition interaction on the desire fo  revenge, as measured by the TRIM 
(McCullough et al., 2006). Trait aggression was included in the model as a covariate. The 
overall model was significant, F(4, 90) = 9.05, p < .001, R2 = .28. The results show no 
main effect of the NFC (β = .08, t(93) = .94, p = .346, ∆R2 = .01) but a significant main 
effect of transgression condition (β = -1.00, t(90) = -2.10, p = .038, ∆R2 = .08) such that 
individuals in the transgression condition exhibited greater desire for revenge (M = 2.73, 
SD = .84) than those in the no transgression condition (M = 2.32, SD = .69). The results 
also show a significant interaction between the NFC and transgression condition (β = 
1.34, t(93) = 2.81, p = .006, ∆R2 = .06). The simple slope analysis3 of the relationship 
between the NFC and desire for revenge revealed that in the transgression condition, 
higher NFC individuals desired significantly greater r venge than lower NFC individuals 
(B = .43, t(93) = 2.57, p = .012), but did not differ in the no transgression c ndition (B = -
.21, t(93) = -1.35, p = .179, see Figure 1).  Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
                                                
3 I utilized the worksheets provided by Jeremy Dawson to plot the graphs and calculate simple slopes 
(Dawson, n.d.). Simple slope analyses are only available using unstandardized regression coefficients 
which is why they, and not the standardized coeffici nts, are reported. This procedure was used for all 





Figure 1. NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the desire for revenge. The NFC is represented as 
dichotomous for illustrative purposes; the NFC was measured and analyzed as a continuous variable. High 
and low values of the NFC in the figure were taken at one standard deviation above and below the mean 
(Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006). 
For exploratory purposes, I also examined the relationship between the NFC, 
transgression condition, and their interaction on the desire for forgiveness. Specifically, I 
conducted a multiple regression analysis with the NFC as a continuous predictor, 
transgression condition as a dichotomous predictor, and the NFC x Transgression 
condition interaction on desire for forgiveness, as measured by the TRIM (McCullough et 
al., 2006). The overall model was significant, F(3, 94) = 12.87, p < .001, R2 = .29. The 
results show a non-significant trend of the NFC in the expected direction (β = -.11, t(94) 
= -1.321, p = .190, ∆R2 = .01) and no main effect of transgression (β = .43, t(94) = .93, p 
= .352, ∆R2 = .25). However, the results show a significant interaction between the NFC 
and transgression condition (β = -.95, t(94) = -2.05, p = .043, ∆R2 = .03). The simple 
slope analysis of the relationship between the NFC and desire for forgiveness revealed 




forgiveness than higher NFC individuals (B = -.37, t(94) = -2.33, p = .022), but high and 
low NFC individuals did not differ in the no transgression condition (B = .08, t(94) = .54, 
p = .586, see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the desire for forgiveness. The NFC is represented 
as dichotomous for illustrative purposes; the NFC was measured and analyzed as a continuous variable. 
High and low values of the NFC in the figure were taken at one standard deviation above and below the 
mean (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006). 
A further exploratory analysis was conducted comparing revenge and forgiveness 
motivations within-participants using a general linear model repeated measures analysis. 
The NFC was dichotomized based on a median split due to the nature of the potential 
three-way interaction to allow for more comprehensible post-hoc analyses. The NFC was 
a dichotomized between-participant factor, transgresion condition was a dichotomous 
between-participant factor, and desires for revenge and forgiveness were repeated 
measures within-participant factors. The results show a significant three-way interaction 
between the NFC, transgression condition, and desires for revenge and forgiveness 




the no transgression condition, forgiveness desires were greater than revenge desires for 
high NFC individuals (M = 3.28, SE = .13 vs. M = 2.18, SE = .15, p < .001) as well as 
low NFC individuals (M = 3.18, SE = .15 vs. M = 2.50, SE = .17, p = .018). However, in 
the transgression condition, individuals high in the NFC experienced greater revenge 
motivations (M = 2.91, SE = .14) than forgiveness motivations (M = 2.28, SE = .13, p = 
.008) whereas low NFC individuals’ motivations for revenge and forgiveness did not 
differ (M = 2.49, SE = .15 and M = 2.63, SE = .14, respectively). For high NFC 
individuals, their desire for revenge was greater in the transgression condition (vs. no 
transgression, p = .001) while their motivations for forgiveness was lower (p < .001). 
Individuals low in the NFC experienced no differenc in their desire for revenge between 
conditions but exhibited a lower desire for forgiveness in the transgression condition (vs. 
no transgression; p = .011) See Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. NFC x Transgression condition  x Revenge/Forgiveness desires within-participant interaction.  
Hypothesis 3 was tested using generalized estimating equation (GEE) analyses 




analysis offers several advantages. Firstly, it includes a within-participants factor which 
is necessary for the repeated measures lexical decision task data. Secondly, GEEs use 
maximum likelihood estimations instead of the least square estimations used in 
regression analyses which are easily biased by outliers. A third advantage of this type of 
analysis is that it can handle incomplete data; instead of excluding data with missing 
cases, it estimates parameters using all of the available data. There was a greater amount 
of missing data with the response latency measures than with the desires for revenge and 
forgiveness measures which is why the former were tsted with GEEs while the latter 
were tested with repeated measures ANOVAs. Lastly, GEEs give me the flexibility to 
detect interactions between the response latencies at time 1 and time 2 as well as 
interactions between response latencies for revenge-related and forgiveness-related 
words. For all GEE analyses, the NFC was dichotomized based on a median split. This 
was utilized due to the nature of the analyses given that three-way interactions were 
expected and post-hoc analyses for dichotomous variables are more comprehensible than 
for continuous variables.  
In the first GEE analysis, time was included as a within-participant factor and the 
NFC and transgression condition were between-participants factors. Response latencies 
for neutral words and nonwords as well as each participant’s error rate were used as 
covariates; response latencies at time 1 and time 2 for revenge-related words were the 
dependent measures. The three-way NFC x Transgression condition x Time interaction 
was not significant (χ2 (1, N = 196) = .23, p = .625). Hypothesis 3 suggests that revenge 
should be equally salient for high and low NFC indivi uals at time 1 while revenge 




were conducted and show that following a transgression, high (vs. low) NFC participants 
responded slower to revenge-related words at time 1 (M = 818.17, SE = 31.35 vs. M = 
709.70, SE = 27.23; p = .009) and marginally slower at time 2 (M = 794.75, SE = 31.05 
vs. M = 713.45, SE = 33.73; p = .091); thus Hypothesis 3 is not supported (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. NFC x Transgression condition  x Time within-participant interaction on response time to 
revenge-related words. 
Hypothesis 3 also includes the implicit assumption hat revenge is more salient 
than forgiveness. Specifically, I argue that the adaptive benefits of revenge should cause 
it to be the first response option that comes to mind when one experiences a 
transgression. To test this, two additional GEEs were conducted with the NFC and 
transgression condition as between-participants factors and response latencies to revenge 
and forgiveness as a within-participants dependent measure. As before, response latencies 
for neutral words and nonwords as well as each participant’s error rate were included as 




For time 1, the NFC x Transgression condition x Revenge-Forgiveness factor 
three-way interaction was not significant (χ2 1, N = 196) = 1.19, p = .275). Planned 
comparisons were conducted examining response latency (in milliseconds) within the 
transgression condition to revenge and forgiveness words separately. The results show 
that high NFC individuals responded significantly slower to revenge words when faced 
with a transgression (M = 831.09, SE = 30.01) than individuals low in the NFC (M = 
723.33, SE = 28.42; p = .009); however, no difference emerged when comparing how 
quickly high and low NFC individuals respond to forgiveness words when confronted 
with a transgression (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. NFC x Transgression condition  x Revenge-Forgiveness within-participant interaction at Time 1. 
For time 2, the NFC x Transgression condition x Revenge-Forgiveness factor was 
also not significant (χ2 (1, N = 196) = .01, p = .924). Planned comparisons were again 
conducted examining response latency within the transgression condition to revenge and 
forgiveness words, separately. The results show that high NFC individuals responded 




transgression than individuals low in the NFC (M = 685.79, SE = 32.19; p = .016). 
Further, this pattern was also found for forgiveness words such that individuals high in 
the NFC responded more slowly (M = 756.33, SE = 26.47) than low NFC individuals (M 
= 619.73, SE = 17.41; p < .001, see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. NFC x Transgression condition  x Revenge-Forgiveness within-participant interaction at Time 2. 
Discussion 
Boyatzi (2011) found initial support for the positive association between the NFC 
and desire for revenge. However, due to the correlation l nature of the relationship found 
in those studies (ibid.), one could argue that high NFC individuals may be more 
aggressive in general. Specifically, perhaps a transgression is not necessary to find a 
positive relationship between the NFC and revenge; perhaps this relationship exists 
naturally and is found in neutral conditions as well. The present study replicates and 
extends the NFC-desire for revenge association by comparing desire for revenge across 
transgression and control conditions. Thus, this study eliminates the potential alternative 




not show increased revenge desires in the neutral vignette control condition which 
provides support for the notion that a transgression is the catalyst for an increased desire 
for revenge among high (vs. low) NFC individuals. It is, potentially, the lack of closure 
caused by the transgression that prompts a revenge r sponse from individuals high (vs. 
low) in the NFC, not a general aggressive disposition. 
The present study also included trait aggression as a covariate to further eliminate the 
possibility that high (vs. low) NFC individuals are simply more aggressive people in 
general. When trait aggression was included as a cov riate, the NFC x Transgression 
condition interaction significantly predicted desir for revenge, indicating that even after 
trait aggression is accounted for, the NFC still predicts one’s desire for vengeance after a 
wrongdoing. 
Additionally, one could argue based on the results of Boyatzi (2011) that the 
relationship directionality between the NFC and desire for revenge may be backwards (or 
bi-directional) such that desire for revenge leads to an increase in one’s NFC or that one’s 
vengeance desires and one’s NFC affect each other in a vicious cycle. Again, however, as 
individuals high in the NFC did not exhibit greater r venge desires than low NFC 
individuals in the no transgression condition, the results eliminate the possibility that 
one’s desire for revenge increases one’s level of the NFC. 
The results from Study 1 provide additional insight into how high and low NFC 
individuals react to a transgression by investigating he relationship between the NFC and 
desire for forgiveness. They show that after a transgression, but not generally, individuals 




Comparing the motivations for revenge and forgiveness within participants as an 
exploratory analysis yielded interesting findings. The no transgression control condition, 
which arguably acts as a baseline, shows that individuals in general have a significantly 
stronger motivation to forgive than to retaliate, rgardless of their level of the NFC. This 
is not unsurprising insofar as one considers that humans are social beings and that the 
primary adaptive function of forgiveness is relationship restoration (Karremans & Van 
Lange, 2004; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). 
However, high and low NFC individuals react differently when confronted with a 
transgression. Specifically, high NFC individuals’ motivation to revenge is significantly 
greater (vs. no transgression) while their forgiveness desire is significantly lower which 
together produce a significantly greater desire for revenge than forgiveness. Thus it 
appears that an unambiguously-intentional transgresion leads high NFC to choose 
revenge over forgiveness. On the other hand, individuals low in the NFC experience no 
difference in their revenge desires between transgres ion and no transgression conditions 
but have a significantly lower motivation for forgiveness following a transgression, 
resulting in no difference between their desires for revenge and forgiveness. In this sense, 
low NFC individuals seem not to make any decision about how to respond to an 
intentional wrongdoing; rather they appear conflicted with equal desires to retaliate and 
to pardon.  
Study 1 went beyond Boyatzi (2011) further by testing the assumption that revenge 
is the most cognitively accessible response option following a transgression. 
Additionally, this study investigated (indirectly) whether high NFC individuals seize and 




the accessibility of revenge. The response latency data do not support either accessibility 
hypothesis (Hypotheses 1 and 3). Specifically, I expected accessibility of revenge to be 
greater for high (vs. low) NFC at time 2 and I expected revenge to be more accessible 
than forgiveness, but the data belie these assumptions.  
However, post hoc analyses show interesting and potentially meaningful trends. It 
seems that a transgression affects high NFC individuals differently than low NFC 
individuals. High (vs. low) NFC individuals are slower to respond to revenge 
immediately after a transgression as well as after  period of time. They are also slower to 
respond to forgiveness at time 2. It appears that the ransgression may “stun” them; it 
creates a lack of closure which needs to be addressed. Considering how to address the 
transgression requires cognitive resources and thus seems to put the participants under 
cognitive load. High (vs. low) NFC individuals were more affected by the cognitive load, 
which may be due to a smaller resource pool (Kossowka, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2010), 
leading to slower response times. 
Limitations. While Study 1 replicated the main relationship of interest and extended 
previous research in significant ways, it is limited by its use of a low-impact hypothetical 
transgression. Furthermore, this study examines the extent to which one desires revenge 
and did not measure one’s willingness to enact retribution. One’s desire for revenge may 
not be similar to the likelihood of engaging in veng ful behavior as such. To address 
these concerns, Studies 3 and 4 will aim to replicate the relationship between the NFC 
and revenge through the use of a transgression experi nc  as well as a behavioral 





Chapter 4: Study 2 
 The results from Study 1 show that after a transgre sion, low (vs. high) NFC 
experience greater cognitive accessibility of revenge and forgiveness. Specifically, in the 
transgression condition (but not the no transgression condition), low (vs. high) NFC 
individuals responded more quickly to revenge at both time points and responded more 
quickly to forgiveness at time 2. Thus it appears that individuals low (vs. high) in the 
NFC are engaging in additional processing by presumably considering both revenge and 
forgiveness following an offense.  
Study 2 examined this possibility by engaging participants in a thought listing 
task through which the potential differences in both the quantity and quality of thoughts 
of high and low NFC individuals were investigated. Similar to Study 1, Study 2 
incorporated a time interval after the transgression; this was intended to allow low NFC 
individuals to carry out additional processing presumably in order to decide how to 
respond to the transgression. The present study contributes to the literature by providing a 
qualitative examination of the cognitive processing occurring after a transgression. The 
thought listing task will be the first investigation to the author’s knowledge in gaining a 
better understanding of how an individual arrives at the decision to retaliate or forgive. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 101 undergraduate psychology studen s (17 men and 84 
women) from a large university with a mean age of 19.46 years who participated in the 




not following directions, leaving data from 90 participants (15 men and 75 women, with a 
mean age of 19.44) for the final analysis. 
Procedure and Design 
Participants completed the study online and were told that the researcher was 
interested in looking into the effect of individual differences on decision making and that 
the study involved responding to several questionnaires. 
Study 2 utilized a correlational design with continuous measurements of the NFC, 
as the independent variable, and extent of information processing and desire for revenge 
and forgiveness, as the dependent measures. Particip nts were given the 15-item short 
version of the NFC scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; α = .84) and responded to all items on 
a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly agree). 
Participants were also presented with a vignette describing a transgression (see 
Appendix E). The transgression described in the vignette was ambiguous to the extent 
that the act could have been intentional or not; this was intended to allow participants to 
engage in additional processing of why the transgression may have occurred. The 
ambiguity of the transgression was especially meant to allow low NFC individuals the 
opportunity to engage in attributive processing, perhaps including perspective taking, 
which previous research has shown they do more so than high NFC individuals (Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994; Webster-Nelson et al., 2003).  
Immediately following the transgression vignette, participants completed a 
thought-listing task during which they were asked to list all of their thoughts. They were 
told to take as much time as they needed and the time they spent on this task was 




(vs. high) NFC individuals an opportunity to counteract the accessibility of revenge as 
well as decide how to respond to the transgression. The thoughts listed were used to test 
the hypotheses that low (vs. high) NFC individuals will list more thoughts in general 
(Hypothesis 4a), will list more thoughts that consider the transgressor’s perspective or 
attribute the transgression to non-dispositional factors (Hypothesis 7), and will consider a 
greater variety of response options to the transgres ion (Hypothesis 5).  The listed 
thoughts will also be used to test the hypothesis that the amount of revenge-related 
thoughts will mediate the association between the NFC and desire for revenge 
(Hypothesis 6). Following the thought-listing task, participants completed the TRIM-18 
questionnaire (McCullough et al., 2006; revenge subscale: α = .80, forgiveness subscale: 
α = .81); used to measure desires for revenge and forgiveness. Participants responded to 
all items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). The 
Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992; α = .87) was administered to control for 
trait aggression and all items were responded to on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely 
uncharacteristic of me to 5 = Extremely characteristic of me). Participants also completed 
a demographic questionnaire. After responding to the survey, participants were 
thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Gender significantly predicted desire for revenge (t(96) = 3.49, p = .001) such that 
men desired greater revenge (M = 2.15, SD = .77) than women (M = 1.59, SD = .53). In 
support of Hypothesis 2, the results show a positive correlation between the NFC and 
desire for revenge (r(98) = .21, p = .033) indicating that the higher one’s NFC, the more 




aggression are included as covariates, this relationship remains significant (β = .22, t(94) 
= 2.51, p = .014, ∆R2 = .04). The results also show a negative associatin between the 
NFC and desire for forgiveness (r(98) = -.23, p = .023) suggesting that individuals higher 
(vs. lower) in the NFC desire less forgiveness. This relationship becomes marginal after 
controlling for trait aggression (β = -.18, t(95) = -1.97, p = .051, ∆R2 = .12). 
An exploratory analysis was conducted comparing revenge and forgiveness 
motivations within participants using a general linear model repeated measures analysis. 
The NFC was dichotomized based on a median split for ease of comprehension. The NFC 
was included as a between-participant factor, gender was included as a covariate, and 
desires for revenge and forgiveness were included as the repeated measures. The results 
show a significant interaction between the NFC and motivations to get revenge and 
forgiveness (F(1,96) = 9.46, p = .003, partial η2 = .09). Probing of the interaction 
revealed that high NFC individuals experienced greater forgiveness desires than revenge 
(M = 3.43, SE = .09 vs. M = 1.85, SE = .07; p < .001) as did low NFC individuals (M = 
3.73, SE = .09 vs. M = 1.50, SE = 08; p < .001). However, the results also show that high 
and low NFC individuals differ in both their motivations for revenge and forgiveness 
when these desires are examined as a within-participant repeated measure. Specifically, 
high NFC individuals desire greater revenge (M = 1.85, SE = .07) than low NFC 
individuals (M = 1.50, SE = 08; p = .002) while individuals low in the NFC desire greater 
forgiveness (M = 3.73, SE = .09) than those high in the NFC (M = 3.43, SE = .09; p = 





Figure 7. NFC x Revenge/Forgiveness desires within-participant interaction.  
Examining the extent of information processing engaged in during the thought-
listing task, the results show the expected negative relationship between NFC and the 
number of thoughts listed (r(95) = -.23, p = .028). Thus, the lower one’s NFC, the more 
thoughts s/he listed following a transgression, consistent with Hypothesis 4a. The amount 
of time spent on the thought listing task was marginally negatively related to the NFC 
(r(98) = -.19, p = .068) showing marginal support for Hypothesis 4b. 
To examine Hypothesis 5, the thoughts listed were cat gorized by content such 
that qualitatively distinct means of responding to the transgression (e.g., revenge, 
forgiveness) were coded as separate categories4. There was no relationship between the 
NFC and quantity of response options considered (r(98) = .01, p = .906). Exploratory 
analyses show that the frequency with which each response option was listed was very 
low for all categories, suggesting possible floor effects: 9.2% of participants mentioned 
forgiveness, 5.1% stated plans to avoid the transgres or, 3.1% discussed (requiring or 
                                                
4 Thoughts were examined for any variation of these constructs. For example, any phrase objectively 





hoping for) an apology, 13.3% wrote down wanting to confront the transgressor, and 0% 
mentioned revenge. Thus, Hypothesis 5 received no support in these data. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the relationship between th  NFC and desire for 
revenge will be mediated by the amount of revenge-related thoughts listed in the thought-
listing task. This hypothesis could not be tested for the simple reason that, as discussed 
above, not a single revenge-related thought was listed during the thought-listing task. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
To test Hypothesis 7, the thoughts were coded for perspective taking or non-
dispositional attributions for the transgression which included concern for the 
transgressor’s well-being. The thoughts were coded by the researcher as well as a 
research assistant; analysis of interrater reliability revealed κ = .82 (Cohen, 1960) which 
exceeds the necessary level of 70% reliability for research purposes (Nunnally, 1978). 
The specific transgression vignette used in the present study described a situation in 
which one friend leaves another at a party without notice when they explicitly had a rule 
against doing so; thus worry for the friend indicates hat s/he may be in a bad situation 
and unintentionally left the friend at the party without warning. These perspective taking 
and concern thoughts included “I assume that my friend must have had a good reason for 
leaving without me if he/she had agreed not to go bef rehand. Some reasons I could think 
of would be that he/she knew I wouldn’t be interested in whatever he/she left to do, or 
that he/she wanted to be alone with someone.” (Participant 66) and “Then, I thought that 
perhaps [I] should be worried, that maybe [my] friend was drunk and was persuaded to 
leave with a guy who had bad intentions” (Participant 76), respectively. Both types of 




participant took the perspective of the transgressor directly in an effort to explain the 
reason s/he acted that way or the participant indicated worry that the transgressor might 
be in unsafe situation which is why the transgression occurred. I conducted a correlation 
analysis of the NFC and proportion of perspective taking and worry thoughts out of the 
total number of thoughts. There was a significant negative relationship between the NFC 
and the proportion of perspective taking/concern thoughts (r(98) = -0.30, p = .002) 
suggesting that individuals lower (vs. higher) in the NFC engage in more effort to 
provide attributions for why the transgression occurred. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is supported. 
An exploratory mediation analysis of the effect of perspective taking/worry 
thoughts on the relationship of the NFC and desire for forgiveness was conducted 
following Baron and Kenny (1986). The predictor variable, the NFC, was significantly 
related both to the outcome variable, desire for forgiveness (β = -.23, t(96) = -2.31, p = 
.023), and to the mediator, proportion of perspectiv  taking/concern thoughts (β = -.30, 
t(96) = -3.15, p = .002). The relationship between proportion of pers ctive 
taking/concern thoughts and desire for forgiveness wa  also significant (β = .29, t(95) = 
2.88, p = .005), and controlling for this effect significantly reduced the size of the effect 
of the NFC on desire for forgiveness (β = -.14, t(95) = -1.405, p = .163). These results 
suggest that the proportion of perspective taking/concern thoughts mediated the effect of 
the NFC on the extent to which forgiveness was desired. 
Discussion 
The present study conceptually replicates the findings of Study 1. Specifically, it 
provides converging evidence for a positive relationship between the NFC and desire for 




Unlike Study 1, however, gender significantly predicted desire for revenge in the present 
study. This could be due to the fact that the transgression used in Study 2 was ambiguous 
whereas the wrongdoing in Study 1 was unequivocal. Because of the ambiguity of the 
transgression in Study 2, other individual differenc s may have played a role in 
determining desire for revenge. Specifically, the generally more-aggressive nature of men 
compared to women (for a review, see Campbell, 2007) may have prompted the greater 
desire for retribution. 
The results further show that both high and low NFC individuals exhibited greater 
motivations for forgiveness than revenge in the present study, although the significant 
interaction and pairwise comparisons show that highNFC individuals again desire 
revenge more than low NFC individuals as well as desire forgiveness less. These results 
show a different pattern than the results from Study 1 and thus underscore the importance 
of the type of transgression experienced. Study 1 manipulated an unequivocal 
transgression in that the transgressor intended to commit the action; Study 2 alternatively 
provided a transgression that was ambiguous in that it was not clear why the 
transgression occurred or if the action was intentional. It appears that both high and low 
NFC individuals prefer to give the (potential) transgressor “the benefit of the doubt” in 
this case. Indeed, several participants discussed in the thought-listing task requiring 
additional information prior to deciding how to respond (e.g., “Information matters to 
infer how I would feel,” Participant 86). 
Whereas previous research has focused on the extent of information processing 
(e.g., Kruglanski et al., 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), the present study contributes 




high) NFC individuals. In particular, Study 2 provided an investigation into the cognitive 
processes that transpire between a transgression occurring and the decision to revenge, 
forgive, or otherwise.  
The present study provides evidence that low (vs. high) NFC individuals engaged 
in greater cognitive processing, both in terms of the number of thoughts they had as well 
as the amount of time they spent processing the transg ession, supporting Hypotheses 4a 
and 4b, respectively. Further, Study 2 investigated th  content of thoughts and found that 
individuals lower (vs. higher) in the NFC had significantly more thoughts pertaining to 
perspective taking or concern for the well-being of the transgressor, supporting 
Hypothesis 7. That is, lower (vs. higher) NFC indivi uals considered to a greater extent 
attributions for why the transgression occurred; these attributions ranged from a) 
acknowledging that everyone makes mistakes to b) suggesting that perhaps the 
transgressor was not of sound mind when making the decision to leave to c) wondering if 
the transgressor was in an unsafe situation and that is why he/she left the party without 
telling the friend.  
The present results offered no support for Hypothesis 5, that low (vs. high) NFC 
individuals would consider thoughts in a wider variety of categories, such as revenge as 
well as forgiveness. It is possible that individuals high and low in the NFC indeed did not 
differ in the number of response options that they considered. Alternatively, it is possible 
that the instructions used for the thought listing task may not have been specific enough 
to elicit the full contents of participant’s thoughts. In particular, there were many 
thoughts that were ambiguous regarding how the participant would respond. In some 




information such as “If she was totally sober and bailed on me I am goin to be so mad at 
her, but right now I just want to make sure she’s okay” (Participant 39) and “Depending 
on what happened to him I would understand if he explained it” (Participant 55). Other 
thoughts were ambiguous in that the participant could have intended revenge but did not 
state so explicitly, such as “[I] should make sure this never happens again” (Participant 
17) and “I would probably get fairly upset and confront my friend, possibly with anger or 
resentment” (Participant 79). Likewise, there were many thoughts (26.6% of thoughts, in 
fact) pertaining to anger, annoyance, frustration, etc. which could subsequently fuel 
actions that would be considered vengeful. However, there was no way to further probe 
participants about their thoughts and therefore the thoughts must be taken at face-value 
without inference. 
Hypothesis 6 was also not supported with the results in Study 2. As previously 
stated, not a single participant wrote down any thoug ts related to revenge. This could be 
due to social desirability concerns since participants may not have felt comfortable about 
stating that they would act overtly negatively toward nother person, especially since the 
transgressor in the vignette is described as a “good friend.” The null results could also be 
due to the ambiguity of some of the thoughts, as discussed above. It may be that 
participants had considered revenge but termed it differently (e.g., as “confrontation”); 
however, without making unsubstantiated inferences, these possibilities cannot be 
unequivocally verified.  
Limitations. Study 2 contributes to the literature by providing an initial 
investigation into the quality of additional cognitive processing engaged in by low (vs. 




desire for revenge are positively related. However, this study is limited in several ways, 
including its use of a low-impact hypothetical transgression as well as a dependent 
measure of one’s desire for revenge instead of measuring vengeful behavior more 
directly. 
It should be noted, however, that although vignettes in general are considered 
“low-impact,” many of the participants in the present study reported having previously 
experienced a similar situation, which seemed to have augmented the impact of the 
present procedure on the participants’ reactions. However, Studies 3 and 4 will address 
the limitations of Studies 1 and 2 by inducing an actu l transgression experience as well 

















Chapter 5: Study 3 
The results from Study 1 show that after a transgression, both revenge and 
forgiveness are more cognitively accessible for low (vs. high) NFC individuals and Study 
2 shows that low (vs. high) NFC individuals engage in greater cognitive processing of a 
transgression by having more thoughts about the transgression, spending more time 
considering the wrongdoing, and having more thoughts pertaining to why the transgressor 
may have acted as they did (i.e., through perspective taking and concern that the 
transgressor may not have left the party intentionally). Specifically, the results of Study 2 
suggest that perspective taking may play a unique role in bolstering one’s decision to 
choose alternatives to revenge.  
Study 3 tests this idea by investigating responses to a transgression under 
experimental and control conditions: a) when the ext nt and nature of cognitive 
processing is directly manipulated through perspectiv  taking instructions and b) when 
individuals’ cognitive processing is not influenced and thus they may respond in 
whichever way they choose (i.e., choosing revenge with minimal cognitive effort or 
deliberating among several response alternatives). My hypothesis is that the perspective 
taking instructions will decrease the revenge tendency of high NFC participants 
(Hypothesis 8). I assumed that such instructions will have relatively little effect on low 
NFC participants insofar as these individuals tend to engage in perspective taking 
anyway.  
The present study also measures the accessibility of revenge using a projection 
task in an effort to provide evidence that revenge is more accessible following a 




varies as a function of the NFC and time (Hypothesis 3). Study 3 further extends the 
investigation of the relation between the NFC and the tendency toward revenge by using 
a higher impact manipulation of the transgression than what was the case in the two 
vignette studies carried out so far, namely involving an actual transgression experience 
(Hypothesis 2).  
Participants engaged in a dictator game in which their partner took a majority of 
the coins in the transgression condition (vs. half of the coins in the control condition). 
Participants were then given the opportunity to take revenge in a subsequent round of the 
dictator game. I assumed that the present manipulaton nd behavioral measure of 
revenge allows for greater ecological validity and generalizability, as compared to a 




Participants were 99 undergraduate psychology studen s (19 men and 80 women) 
from a large university with a mean age of 19.54 years who participated in the study in 
exchange for course credit. 
Procedure and Design 
 Participants took the study online5 and were told that the researcher was interested 
in looking into the effect of individual differences on decision making and that the study 
                                                
5 Studies 3 and 4 began as laboratory studies; however, both were ended early after a preliminary suspicion 
check analysis revealed that a large proportion of participants raised suspicion that their partner was not a 
real person. Study 3 was adapted to be an online study which required several emails to a Research 
Assistant in order to be set up with a partner during a scheduled participation time. A code to enter th  
study was utilized to prevent non-scheduled participants from taking the study. Suspicion check analyses 
revealed that far fewer participants were suspicious through the online format. Therefore, the online format 




involved several questionnaires and computer tasks. Additionally, they were told that one 
of the computer tasks involved a partner, another participant, who was located elsewhere. 
 The study utilized a 2 (transgression: present and absent) x 2 (perspective taking: 
present and neutral) x 2 (aggression accessibility at ime: 1 and 2) design with 
transgression and perspective taking conditions as between-participants factors, time as a 
within-participants factor and the NFC as a continuous factor. Gender produced no 
significant main effects or interactions, so it will not be mentioned further. 
Participants’ NFC was measured via the 15-item need for closure scale, short-
version (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; α = .84) and they responded to all items on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly agree). Participants were also given 
filler questionnaires described as personality measures.  
To manipulate a transgression, participants engaged in a dictator task believing 
they were playing with another participant. All participants were assigned the role of 
“Observer” for the first round while their partner was assigned the role of “Delegator6.” 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the transgression condition, in which the 
partner took 90% of the coins, or a control condition, in which the partner took 50% of 
the coins. Immediately following the dictator task, participants completed the first of two 
word completion tasks to measure the accessibility of revenge-related (i.e., aggression) 
words compared to neutral words. This partly constituted the measurement of the 
dependent variable for an additional test of the hypotheses that revenge is more 
cognitively accessible following a transgression (vs. no transgression; Hypothesis 1) and 
                                                
6 A Delegator is the term used in the study for a “dictator” in the Dictator Game. This individual had full 
license to distribute the resources as they wished. All participants were told they were assigned the rol of 
“Observer” for the first round in order to manipulate a transgression or neutral interaction with their 





that the accessibility of revenge will vary as a function of the NFC and time (Hypothesis 
3). Thus, I test Hypotheses 1 and 3 across several methodologies. Participants then 
answered a question serving as a manipulation check for the transgression manipulation 
which was imbedded among other questions about the game; specifically, they rated the 
extent to which they agreed that their partner played fairly on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
Completely Disagree to 5 = Completely Agree). 
The manipulation check was followed by random assignment to a perspective 
taking or neutral condition. Participants in the pers ctive taking condition were asked to: 
“Please take a minute to consider (1) how you would have acted as the Delegator in 
Round 1, (2) what you believe he/she was thinking ad feeling when allocating the coins, 
and (3) how you believe he/she came up with the decision to allocate the coins” in line 
with previous manipulations (Galinsky et al., 2008). Participants in the neutral condition 
went straight to the next task.  
Participants then completed a second word completion task measuring 
accessibility of aggression words. This was followed by a second round of the dictator 
task in which the participant acted as the Delegator, believing s/he was interacting with 
the same partner. The amount of coins the participant g ve to his/her partner is the 
behavioral measure of revenge, with lower amounts reflecting greater revenge. 
Participants then completed a demographic questionna re. After completing the survey, 
participants were thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that participants in the transgression (vs. no transgression) 




to investigate this possibility, I conducted a t test of the effect of the transgression (vs. no 
transgression) condition on the total number of items that were completed with 
aggressive words in the word completion task. The results show that individuals 
presented with a transgression (vs. no transgression) d d not provide more aggressive 
words (t(97) < 1, p = .887), contrary to Hypothesis 1.  
A test of the manipulation check shows that individuals in the transgression 
condition perceived their partner as having played the dictator game less fairly (M = 2.84, 
SD = 1.22) than individuals in the no transgression cdition (M = 4.56, SD = .84; t(97) = 
-8.08, p < .001 ), while perceptions of partner fairness did not vary as a function of the 
NFC. Further, a manipulation check of the transgression ma ipulation shows that 
individuals presented with a transgression (vs. no transgression) gave fewer coins to their 
partner (M = 41.69, SD = 26.30 vs. M = 50.83, SD = 18.60, respectively; t(97) = -1.98, p 
= .050) and thus exhibited more pronounced revenge behavior. Therefore, the 
manipulation of transgression was successful.  
To test Hypothesis 2, that higher (vs. lower) NFC individuals will be more likely 
to engage in revenge after a transgression, I conducte  a multiple regression analysis with 
the NFC as a continuous predictor, transgression conditi n as a dichotomous predictor 
and their interaction on the dependent measure of rvenge behavior. As noted above, 
revenge was operationalized as the number of coins participants gave to their partner, 
with fewer coins denoting greater revenge. The overall model was significant (F(3, 95) = 
4.08, p = .009, R2 = .11). The results show a significant main effect of the NFC (β = -.21, 
t(95) =  -2.25, p = .026, ∆R2 = .03) and a trending main effect of transgression (β = .80, 




interaction between the NFC and transgression conditi  (β = -1.03, t(95) = -1.81, p = 
.073, ∆R2 = .03) A simple slope analysis revealed that in the transgression condition, 
higher NFC individuals gave significantly fewer coins to the partner than lower NFC 
individuals (B = -13.26, t(95) = -2.82, p = .006) while the amount of coins did not differ 
in the no transgression condition as a function of the NFC (B = -1.45, t(95) = -.32, p = 
.748). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the extent of vengeful behavior. Fewer coins given 
to one’s partner denotes greater revenge behavior. The NFC is represented as dichotomous for illustrative 
purposes; the NFC was measured and analyzed as a continuous variable. High and low values of the NFC 
in the figure were taken at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Dawson & Richter, 2006). 
As a test of Hypothesis 3, I conducted a general linear model repeated measures 
analysis wherein the NFC was a dichotomized predictor, transgression condition was a 
dichotomous predictor, and time was a within-participant factor. The dependent measure 
was the total number of items that were completed with aggressive words in the word 




split due to the nature of the analysis; specifically,  three-way interaction was expected 
and post hoc comparisons are more comprehensible for non-continuous variables. The 
three-way NFC x Transgression condition x Time interaction was not significant (F < 1, 
p = .615). Hypothesis 3 suggests that revenge should be equally salient for high and low 
NFC individuals at time 1 while revenge should be more salient for high (vs. low) NFC at 
time 2. Planned comparison analyses were conducted and show no differences at time 1 
in the number of items completed with aggressive words between high and low NFC in 
either the transgression condition (p = .891) or no transgression condition (p = .131) nor 
at time 2 (p =  .580 for transgression condition and p =  .959 for no transgression 
condition). Results instead show a significant main effect of time (F(1,87) = 42.31, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .30) such that more items were completed with aggressive words at time 
2 (M = 7.46, SD= .24 vs. M = 5.40, SD= .25 at time 1) for high and low NFC individuals 
in both the transgression and no transgression conditi s. Thus Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported. 
To test Hypothesis 8, for which I expected an interaction between the NFC and 
perspective taking condition, I conducted a multiple regression analysis with the NFC as 
a continuous predictor, transgression condition and perspective taking conditions as 
dichotomous predictors, and revenge behaviors as the dependent measure. Revenge was 
operationalized as the number of coins participants gave to their partner, with fewer coins 
indicating greater revenge. The overall model was significant, F(7, 91) = 2.17, p = .043, 
R2 = .14. The results show a significant main effect of the NFC (β = -.21, t(91) = -2.16, p 
= .033, ∆R2 = .03), a non-significant trend of transgression codition in the expected 




perspective taking in the expected direction (β = -.74, t(91) = -1.28, p = .203, ∆R2 < 
.001). There is a marginal interaction between the NFC and transgression condition (β = -
.97, t(91) = -1.68, p = .096, ∆R2 = .03), a non-significant trend in the expected direct on 
between the NFC and perspective taking condition (β = .75, t(91) = 1.30, p = .196, ∆R2 = 
.01), and a non-significant interaction between trasgression and perspective taking 
conditions (β = -.69, t(91) = -1.19, p = .235, ∆R2 = .01). The three-way interaction 
between the NFC, transgression condition, and perspective taking conditions is not 
significant (β = .68, t(91) = 1.17, p = .243, ∆R2 = .01); however, this omnibus interaction 
does not constitute an appropriate test of the theory because I do not expect any 
differences within the no transgression condition or between high and low NFC in the 
perspective taking condition. As I only hypothesize a difference between high and low 
NFC individuals in the no perspective taking condition (as the perspective taking 
condition was designed to remove the difference betwe n them), I carried out planned 
comparisons to test this hypothesis. 
As expected, the only differences in revenge behavior were found between higher 
and lower NFC individuals who experienced a transgre sion and were not provided with 
perspective taking instructions. Specifically, slope difference test7 results show that the 
relevant slopes differ (slopes 3 and 4 in Figure 9; t(91) = -2.00, p = .047) while no other 
slope pairs are significantly different. Specifically, the slopes that differ are those 
showing the amount of coins higher and lower NFC individuals gave to the partner in the 
no perspective taking condition across the transgres ion and no transgression conditions 
(see Figure 9). 
                                                





Figure 9. NFC x Transgression condition x Perspective Taking (PT) condition interaction on the extent of 
vengeful behavior, operationalized as the amount of coins given to one’s partner with fewer coins 
signifying greater revenge. 
Discussion 
 Although Studies 1 and 2 provide interesting results that are generally consistent 
with my theory, Study 3 addresses several methodological limitations of these earlier 
experiments. A primary limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is their use of hypothetical 
transgressions. The present study addressed this limitation by employing a stronger-
impact transgression experience. The earlier studies ar  also limited by their dependent 
measure of intentions to get revenge. Study 3 contended this potential issue with its use 
of a behavioral measure of vengeance. In this way, the present study was able to 




holds only with regard to one’s desire for or intentio  to get revenge, and is not sustained 
with actual retaliatory behavior. 
The results of the present study, as those of Study 1, were unable to support 
Hypothesis 1: that revenge is more accessible for individuals in the transgression 
condition compared with those in the no transgression condition. However, the 
manipulation check of partner fairness shows that te manipulation was effective; 
specifically, participants who experienced a transgre sion rated their partner as less fair 
than participants in the no transgression condition. The results also show that the 
transgression condition led to more revenge behavior than that exhibited by participants 
in the no transgression condition. Consequently, it was not the weakness of the 
manipulation that led to the null findings. 
A possible reason for the null results on the accessibility measure is that it was 
projective and hence arguably not sensitive enough to detect the expected effect. The task 
instructions required participants to respond with the first word that came to mind; 
however, participants may have thought of more thanone word in a short time span and 
then chosen one over the other based on their preferenc .  
Intriguingly, the present results show a main effect of time such that more items 
were completed with aggressive words at time 2 thanat time 1 regardless of transgression 
condition and regardless of one’s level of the NFC. Since different items were used for 
each time point, one explanation for this finding is that the items used for time 2 are 
generally easier to complete with aggressive words than the items used for time 1. Study 





The current study was successful in providing further converging support for the 
relationship between the NFC and revenge; in this sen e, it extends previous findings in a 
significant way by using more ecologically-valid measures and by showing that the 
relationship exists beyond intentions for revenge. The results support Hypothesis 2 by 
showing through a simple slope analysis that within e transgression condition, high 
NFC individuals gave significantly fewer coins than individuals low in the NFC, whereas 
coins given to the partner did not differ in the no transgression condition.  
While Study 2 investigated the extent and quality of additional cognitive 
processing engaged in more by low than high NFC individuals, Study 3 directly 
manipulated cognitive processing of the transgression to examine the effects on one’s 
retaliatory behavior. Testing this hypothesis, the results showed that increasing one’s 
motivation to engage in perspective taking resulted in lesser revenge behaviors. 
Specifically, this manipulation was intended to encourage high NFC individuals to “act 
like low NFC individuals” and process the transgression more fully, including thinking 
about how the transgressor decided to act in that way. Thus, perspective taking should 
have eliminated the difference in revenge between individuals high and low in the NFC, 
and it did.  
While the first three studies so far have found a reliable relationship between the 
NFC and revenge, all used dispositional NFC as the ind pendent variable. Research to 
date, including Boyatzi (2011), has therefore only shown the relationship through 
measured NFC.  Study 4 will address this limitation by attempting to replicate the NFC-





Chapter 6: Study 4 
In Study 4, I attempt to replicate and extend Studies 1, 2, and 3. Specifically, as 
the first three studies show consistent results that higher (vs. lower) dispositional NFC 
leads to greater revenge after an injustice, Study 4 aims to conceptually replicate this 
finding through a direct manipulation of the NFC. Manipulating the NFC, I expected that 
participants in the low (vs. high) NFC condition will exhibit fewer retaliatory behaviors 
following a transgression (Hypothesis 9). 
Study 4 also provides additional tests of several hypotheses. Specifically, Study 4 
tests the hypothesis that the accessibility of revenge-related words will be greater after a 
transgression (vs. neutral experience; Hypothesis 1) and that the accessibility of revenge-
related words will vary as a function of the NFC and time (Hypothesis 3). Additionally, 
Study 4 tests the hypotheses that low (vs. high) NFC individuals will list more thoughts 
following an injustice (Hypothesis 4a), will spend a greater amount of time processing 
the transgression (Hypothesis 4b), will have more pers ective taking thoughts 
(Hypothesis 7), will consider a greater variety of response options to the transgression 
(Hypothesis 5), and that the amount of revenge-related thoughts will mediate the 
association between the NFC and revenge (Hypothesis 6). 
Further, Study 4 tests an alternative hypothesis regarding the accessibility 
measure used in Study 3. Specifically, it is possible that the items used in Study 3 at time 
2 were easier to complete with aggressive words than t e items used at time 1, and that 
this accounts for the greater accessibility of aggression at time 2 versus time 1. To 








Participants were 138 undergraduate psychology studen s (31 men and 107 
women) from a large university with a mean age of 19.48 years who participated in the 
study in exchange for course credit. Twenty participants were excluded for not following 
directions with the NFC manipulation or due to suspicion that they were not working 
with a partner; this left for the final analysis 118 participants (28 men and 90 women) 
with a mean age of 19.47 years. 
Procedure and Design 
Participants were told that the researcher was interes d in looking into the effect 
of individual differences on decision making and that the study, taken online, involved 
several questionnaires and computer tasks. Additionally, they were told that one of the 
tasks involved a partner who was located separately. 
Study 4 employed a 2 (NFC: high and low) x 2 (transgre sion: present and absent) 
x 2 (accessibility of aggression at time: 1 and 2) esign with the NFC and transgression 
condition as between-participants factors and time as a within-participants factor. Gender 
produced no significant main effects or interactions, so it will not be mentioned further. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a high or low NFC manipulation 
condition. The NFC was manipulated through a recall task such that items from the NFC 
scale (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994) were transformed into a recall task; this procedure 




instances in which they behaved in line with a high (or low) NFC (see Appendix F). For 
instance, participants in the high NFC manipulation c dition were asked to “Please 
think back and recall times when in a social conflict, you could easily see which side was 
right and which was wrong” and participants in the low NFC manipulation condition 
were asked to “Please think back and recall times when you felt comfortable even though 
you didn’t understand the reason why an event occurred in your life.”  
To manipulate a transgression, participants engaged in a dictator task and were 
told that they were playing with another participant, located elsewhere. All participants 
were assigned the role of “Observer” for the first round while their partner was assigned 
the role of “Delegator.” Participants were randomly assigned to either the transgression 
condition, in which the partner took 90% of the coins, or a control condition, in which the 
partner took 50% of the coins. Participants then answered a question serving as a 
manipulation check for the transgression manipulation; specifically, they rated how fairly 
they felt their partner played when s/he acted as the Delegator. 
Immediately following the manipulation check, participants completed the first of 
two word completion tasks which measured the accessibility of revenge-related (i.e., 
aggression) and neutral words. This partly constituted the measurement of the dependent 
variable for an additional test of the hypotheses that revenge is the most cognitively 
accessible option following a transgression (vs. no transgression, Hypothesis 1) and that 
the accessibility of revenge-related words will vary s a function of the NFC and time 
(Hypothesis 3).  
The word completion task was followed by a thought listing task, during which 




intended to provide low (vs. high) NFC individuals n opportunity to engage in additional 
cognitive processing in order to counteract the accessibility of revenge and decide how to 
respond. The thoughts listed were used to test the hypotheses that low (vs. high) NFC 
individuals will list more thoughts in general (Hypothesis 4a), spend a greater amount of 
time processing the transgression (Hypothesis 4b), have more thoughts pertaining to non-
dispositional attributions for the transgression such as taking the transgressor’s 
perspective (Hypothesis 7), will consider a greater variety of response options to the 
transgression (Hypothesis 5), and that the amount of revenge-related thoughts will 
mediate the relationship between the NFC and revenge (Hypothesis 6).  
Participants then completed the second word completion task measuring 
accessibility of revenge-related and neutral words. The second word completion task was 
followed by another dictator task which this time included the participant as Delegator, 
believing s/he was playing the same partner. The amount of coins the participant gave to 
the partner was the behavioral measure of revenge, which was used to test the hypothesis 
that individuals in the low (vs. high) NFC condition would exhibit less revenge (i.e., give 
more coins to the partner; Hypothesis 9). This was followed by a demographic 
questionnaire. After completing the survey, participants were thoroughly debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Results 
To test Hypothesis 1, that revenge-related (i.e., aggression) words would be more 
accessible after a transgression than after a neutral experience, I conducted a t test 
between the transgression and no transgression conditions on the sum of items completed 




conditions on accessibility of aggression (t(117) = .50, p = 612), thus these data do not 
support Hypothesis 1. However, a test of the manipulation check reveals that individuals 
in the transgression condition rated their partner as having played less fairly (M = 2.70, 
SD = 1.17) than in the no transgression condition (M = 4.58, SD = .72; p < .001); they 
also exhibited greater revenge behavior by giving their partner fewer coins (M = 41.56, 
SD = 28.03) than in the no transgression condition (M = 54.24, SD = 20.38; p = .010). 
Perceptions of partner fairness did not vary as a function of the NFC. These results 
suggest that the transgression manipulation was effective.  
As a test of Hypothesis 3, I conducted a repeated masures ANOVA with the 
NFC and transgression condition as between-participants factors and time 1 and 2 of the 
word completion task as a within-participants factor. The results show a marginally 
significant main effect of time (F(1,115) = 3.64, p = .059 such that more items were 
completed with aggressive words at time 1 (M = 6.93, SD = .21) than at time 2 (M  = 
6.45, SD = .23). The interaction of interest between the NFC, transgression condition, and 
time was not significant (F < 1), thus Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Two-way ANOVAs were conducted to test Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 7 with the 
NFC and transgression condition as between-participants factors on the dependent 
measures of number of thoughts (Hypothesis 4a), amount of time spent on the thought 
listing task (Hypothesis 4b) and the number of persctive taking or situational 
attribution related thoughts (Hypothesis 7).  The int raction between the NFC and 
transgression condition on the total number of thoug ts was not significant (F 1,115) < 1, 
p = .495) and the planned comparisons between individuals high and low in the NFC in 




Hypothesis 4a is not supported. Likewise, the interaction was not significant for the 
amount of time spent on the task (F(1,115) < 1, p = .734) nor were the planned 
comparisons within the transgression condition betwe n individuals high and low in the 
NFC, thus Hypothesis 4b is not supported. Further, t  interaction was also not 
significant for the number of perspective taking thoughts (F(1,115) < 1, p = .327) and the 
planned comparisons between high and low NFC individuals in the transgression 
condition did not provide any significant differences; consequently, Hypothesis 7 is not 
supported.  
Hypothesis 5 states that low (vs. high) NFC individuals will consider a greater 
variety of response options. The results show that 3 participants mentioned planning to 
give fewer coins to his/her partner (i.e., revenge), 17 participants indicated planning to 
reciprocate the amount they received from their partner, and 11 participants stated 
intending to give his/her partner a greater number of coins than s/he received. It should be 
noted that these plans were found to be mutually exclusive and so no participant 
considered more than one response option. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
 A mediation analysis of the effect of revenge-related thoughts on the relationship 
of the NFC and revenge behaviors was conducted. The predictor variable, the NFC, was 
not related to the mediator variable, revenge-related thoughts: the interaction between the 
NFC and transgression condition was not significant (F(1,93) < 1, p = .835). Therefore, 
the number of revenge-related thoughts did not mediat  the relationship between the NFC 
and revenge behaviors and thus Hypothesis 6 is not upported8.  
                                                
8 A crosstabs analysis reveals that of the participants who mentioned intending to get revenge, all three 




To test Hypothesis 9, which states that lowering (vs. enhancing) an individual’s 
NFC situationally will lead to lesser retaliatory behavior following a transgression but not 
after a neutral experience, I conducted a two-way ANOVA. The NFC and transgression 
conditions were between-participants factors and the dependent measure was revenge 
behavior, operationalized as the number of coins given to the partner with fewer coins 
indicating greater revenge. The overall model was significant, F(3, 114) = 3.63, p = .015, 
R2 = .08. The results reveal a trending main effect of the NFC (F(1,114) = 2.01, p = .159, 
partial η2 = .01), such that individuals in the high NFC condition gave fewer coins to the 
partner (M  = 44.49, SD = 3.66) than individuals in the low NFC condition (M  = 51.41, 
SD = 3.21), and a significant main effect of transgresion condition (F(1,114) = 6.06,  p = 
.015, partial η2 = .05) such that individuals in the transgression c dition gave their 
partners fewer coins (M  = 41.95, SD = 2.95) and thus exhibited greater revenge behavior 
than participants in the no transgression condition (M  = 53.95, SD = 3.87). The 
interaction between the NFC and transgression conditi  was not significant (F(1,114) < 
1, p = .354, partial η2 = .01); however, planned comparisons reveal the exp cted 
differences. Specifically, high NFC individuals gave fewer coins (M = 36.23, SD = 4.03) 
than low NFC individuals in the transgression condition (M = 47.67, SD = 4.32; p = .055) 
as well as gave fewer coins than high NFC individuals in the no transgression condition 
(M = 52.76, SD = 6.11; p = .026). This latter comparison between high NFC individuals 
in the transgression (vs. no transgression) condition provides evidence that the 
manipulation of the NFC was successful. High and low NFC individual did not differ in 
the number of coins they gave to their partners in the no transgression condition (p = 





Figure 10. NFC x Transgression condition interaction on the extent of vengeful behavior, operationalized 
as the amount of coins given to one’s partner with fewer coins signifying greater revenge. 
Discussion 
 The previous studies found consistent results showing that the NFC leads to 
greater revenge desires and vengeful behavior; however, they were limited by the use of 
dispositional NFC. Study 4 addressed this limitation by conceptually replicating the 
results through situationally-induced NFC. Thus, this study provides evidence that 
lowering one’s NFC through a situational manipulation leads to lesser revenge behaviors 
while augmenting one’s NFC leads to greater retaliatory behavior. 
 Studies 1 and 3 were unable to support Hypotheses 1 and 3 across different 
methodologies. The results from Study 3 suggest the proj ctive word completion task 
may have been inherently flawed in that the second set of items may have been easier to 
complete with aggressive words than the first set of items. Study 4 addressed this 
possibility by exchanging the sets to investigate if he original second set, which was 




the original first set, which was presented second in Study 4. The results confirm this 
hypothesis and thus the measure is intrinsically defective when the items are divided in 
two as was done in this investigation. Therefore, Hypotheses 1 and 3 were unable to be 
tested with this methodology. 
 The hypotheses regarding the extent and content of cognitive processing of the 
transgression (Hypotheses 4-7) were also unable to b supported with the data from 
Study 4. When considering the transgression used in the present study, however, it 
appears that the nature of this specific wrongdoing did not provide enough opportunity 
for additional cognitive processing to occur. In particular, the transgression situation 
included an anonymous stranger keeping a majority of coins for him/herself and 
consequently giving another individual a small portion of coins. This transgression was 
likely viewed as relatively minor in severity; indeed, nearly 40% of participants (38.1%) 
within the transgression condition did not even rate their partner as having played 
unfairly. Further, the transgression was unambiguous in that there was no uncertainty 
regarding if the partner intended to distribute the coins unevenly or not. Thus, there does 
not appear to be enough “background information” to consider when processing the 
transgression, nor does there seem to be any opportunity for low NFC individuals to give 









Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 The purpose of the present research was to examine how individuals low (vs. 
high) in the NFC respond to a transgression and specifically, how they refrain from 
engaging in vengeful behaviors. In four studies I investigated the cognitive processes that 
these individuals undertake following their suffering an injustice. I have argued that a 
transgression signifies that one is vulnerable to harm; specifically, a transgression may 
introduce an uncertainty as to how a person will react to injustice, and thus may be 
viewed as a lack of closure. I further argued that revenge could represent the most 
accessible response after a transgression because it provides adaptive benefits. Therefore, 
individuals high in the NFC should seize and freeze on revenge in order to provide quick 
and lasting closure by “answering” the transgression with revenge. Low NFC individuals 
should not seize and freeze on revenge, as they are not motivated by the same urgency 
and permanency goals characterized by high NFC. Boyatzi (2011) found a significant 
positive association between the NFC and desire for revenge; however, the mechanism 
that links the NFC and revenge remained untested until the present investigation. Thus, 
the current paper addresses this gap by examining how high and low NFC individuals 
decide how to respond to transgressions and what factors may influence the decision. 
Throughout the present studies, I tested my theory that low (vs. high) NFC 
individuals counteract the accessibility of revenge aft r experiencing a transgression and 
proceed to engage in more elaborative cognitive processing of the situation before 
making a decision about how to respond to the transgres or. I further tested my 
assumption that time is required for low (vs. high) NFC individuals to counteract revenge 




immediately following the injustice as well as at a later time point. Lastly, I tested my 
premise that encouraging additional cognitive processing of the transgression through 
perspective taking should lead to lesser revenge behaviors.  
Support for Hypotheses 
 Across all four studies, I found support for the general relationship between the 
NFC and revenge: that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC are more likely to desire 
revenge and engage in retaliatory behaviors (Hypotheses 2 and 9). Study 1 found that the 
NFC interacted with transgression condition such that within the transgression condition 
but not in the no transgression condition, individuals higher (vs. lower) in the NFC 
desired revenge to a greater extent after trait aggression was included as a covariate. 
Study 2 found that the NFC predicted the desire for revenge such that individuals higher 
(vs. lower) in the NFC desired revenge to a greater extent, even after trait aggression and 
gender were controlled for. Study 3 also found the expected interaction between the NFC 
and transgression condition to provide a replication of Study 1’s results: in the 
transgression condition only, higher (vs. lower) NFC individuals engaged in greater 
revenge behaviors. In Study 4, the NFC was situation lly induced and the relationship 
between the NFC and revenge was conceptually replicated such that individuals in the 
high (vs. low) NFC condition exhibited greater reveng  behavior following a 
transgression but did not differ when no transgression was present. Further, individuals in 
the high NFC condition who experienced a transgression exhibited greater revenge than 
high NFC individuals in the no transgression condition. 
 These findings are important because they demonstrate a reliable relationship 




more likely to desire revenge as well as engage in r taliatory behaviors following a 
transgression. Further, Studies 1 and 2 eliminate the alternative hypothesis that high NFC 
individuals are generally more aggressive, thus showing that a transgression acts to create 
a lack of closure which high (more so than low) NFC individuals are more likely to 
address with revenge. Across the four studies, the patt rn of results is consistent and in 
the hypothesized direction; to provide further evidnce for the reliability of the 
relationship between the NFC and revenge, the results of each study were combined in 
meta-analytic fashion following the chi-square model of Jones and Fiske (1953). The 
results revealed that the combined results of the four studies are significant, χ2(8, N = 
405total, 276transgression) = 38.96, p < .0001 and thus provide additional substantiation that 
the NFC-revenge relationship is robust. 
 Study 2 investigated more precisely how lower (vs.higher) NFC individuals 
refrain from revenge by examining the additional cognitive processing that was 
hypothesized to occur. The results show that when faced with a relatively ambiguous 
transgression, lower (vs. higher) NFC individuals have more thoughts, spend a 
marginally greater amount of time processing the transgression, and provide a greater 
number of perspective taking or non-dispositional attributive thoughts for why the 
transgression occurred. The findings are notable because they support my theory that 
lower (vs. higher) NFC individuals engage in more cognitive processing of the 
transgression (Hypotheses 4a and 4b) and that this processing may be how they abstain 
from desiring and engaging in revenge. Specifically, the support of Hypothesis 7 shows 
that individuals lower (vs. higher) in the NFC provided more attributions for the 




 Perspective taking of the transgressor was directly manipulated in Study 3 to 
examine if this form of additional cognitive processing may be one way that lower (vs. 
higher) NFC individuals choose to respond to transgre sions through means other than 
revenge. When individuals were given instructions to take the perspective of the 
transgressor, the difference in revenge behaviors between high and low NFC individuals 
was eliminated. This suggests that perspective taking may be a type of additional 
cognitive processing naturally engaged in by individuals low (vs. high) in the NFC 
following a transgression experience (Hypothesis 8). 
Interpreting Negative Results 
 Across three studies (1, 3, and 4) and two methodologies (a response latency 
measure and a projective word completion task), I was unable to find support for 
Hypothesis 1, that revenge is more accessible following a transgression (vs. no 
transgression). These null results prompt the question: Is revenge always the most 
accessible response to any situation? If so, then individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC 
may seize and freeze on it following a transgression because the injustice causes a lack of 
closure; they would not seize and freeze on revenge, however salient it may be, in the 
absence of a transgression, because there would be no closure to achieve. However, the 
response latency results of Study 1 show that in both the transgression and no 
transgression conditions, participants responded to forgiveness significantly more quickly 
than to revenge, regardless of the individual’s leve  of the NFC. Thus, these findings do 
not support the suggestion that revenge is always slient. Further, if seizing and freezing 




should be more likely to forgive following a transgression since forgiveness was more 
cognitively accessible than revenge.  
 The results described above reveal that a transgres ion does not cause revenge to 
be more accessible. The remaining accessibility hypothesis, suggesting an interaction 
between the NFC and time on the accessibility of revenge, was also not supported across 
Studies 1, 3, and 4. The accessibility measure usedin Studies 3 and 4 appears to be 
inherently flawed (discussed below) and consequently, Hypothesis 3 was only truly tested 
in Study 1. The results from this study showed thathigh (vs. low) NFC individuals were 
slower in responding to revenge-related words following a transgression at both time 
points. The findings further revealed that after a transgression, these individuals were also 
slower to respond to forgiveness-related words at time 2. These results imply that a 
transgression cognitively “stuns” high, but not low, NFC individuals by causing a lack of 
closure which requires a response. Contemplating how one should address the 
transgression necessitates cognitive work and thus requires resources; this cognitive 
processing appears to put the participants under load. Given the slower response times for 
high (vs. low) NFC individuals, it seems that they were more affected by the cognitive 
load, which may be due to a smaller resource pool (K ssowska et al., 2010).  
 Considered collectively, the lack of support for the accessibility hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 1 and 3) suggest that the mechanism leading high (vs. low) NFC individuals 
to have greater desire for revenge may not be seizing and freezing on revenge as the most 
accessible option. It is important to note that these accessibility results do not correspond 
to the results regarding desires for revenge and forgiveness. Specifically, while 




the desire for revenge was greater. And while accessibility of forgiveness was greater 
than revenge for all individuals after an ambiguous transgression, the same cannot be said 
regarding a clear-cut transgression. Following a transgression for which the intent is 
unequivocal, high NFC individuals desired revenge more than forgiveness, and among 
low NFC individuals, the desires were not statistically different.  
 It was expected that low (vs. high) NFC individuals refrain from engaging in 
revenge due to more elaborative cognitive processing which was expected to include 
consideration of a variety of alternative response options, such as forgiveness. The results 
were unable to support this prediction (Hypothesis 5) in either Study 2 or Study 4. Given 
the unambiguous nature of the transgression in Study 4, I will discuss it separately below. 
In Study 2, it is possible that individuals high and low in the NFC indeed did not differ in 
the number of response options that they considered. On the other hand, it is possible that 
the instructions used for the thought listing task may have been too general in asking for 
“thoughts about the transgression” instead of asking about specific thoughts that relate to 
how to respond to the transgression. The results reveal that there were many thoughts that 
were ambiguous regarding how the participant would respond. Some cases highlight that 
the participant was withholding judgment until s/he gathered more information while 
other thoughts were ambiguous in that the participant may have intended retribution but 
did not explicitly state planning to get revenge.  
Relatedly, Hypothesis 6 was also not supported by the results of Study 2. As 
previously stated, no participants wrote down revenge-related thoughts. The null results 
may be due to the ambiguity of some of the thoughts, as previously discussed. It may be 




“confrontation”). These results may also be due to social desirability concerns in that 
participants may have felt uncomfortable boldly stating that they would act aggressively 
toward another person, especially since the transgres o  in the vignette was described as a 
“good friend.”  
Methodological Issues 
 Two methodologies used in the current investigation presented issues regarding 
analyses and interpretation. The first problematic methodology is the word completion 
task used as an accessibility measure of revenge-relat d (i.e., aggression) words 
(Anderson et al., 2003) in Studies 3 and 4. The measur  in its entirety includes 98 items, 
50 of which can be completed with aggression words. I separated the measure in half, 
keeping the first half of items for one part of them asure and the second half of the items 
for the other part. Unfortunately, the results of Studies 3 and 4 provide evidence that the 
second half of items may simply have been easier to complete with aggression words 
than the first half of items. Therefore, this measure cannot be used to accurately test for 
accessibility of revenge-related or aggression words across time (Hypothesis 3). 
 The second methodological issue arose with the transgression used in Study 4. In 
this case, the transgression was manipulated throug the dictator allotting 10% (vs. 50%) 
of the coins to the participant. This was an unambiguous transgression for which there 
was no question about whether the Delegator intended to allocate the coins in that 
manner. Further, the Delegator was an anonymous strange  (unlike the “good friend” in 
Study 2) and thus there was no history of friendship or norms within the relationship to 
be taken into account; there was also no future relationship (i.e., relationship 




background information or uncertainty about the transgression to allow low (vs. high) 
NFC individuals the opportunity to thoroughly process the transgression as they did in 
Study 2. In fact, the average number of thoughts about the transgression in Study 4 was 
1.64 and ranged from 0-5 thoughts whereas the average number of thoughts in Study 2 
was 4.92 and ranged from 1-20 thoughts. Since the transgression did not appear to require 
much cognitive processing, it is a less appropriate manipulation with which to test the 
hypotheses regarding extent and content of additional cognitive processing (Hypotheses 
4a, 4b, 5, 6, and 7). Thus, while the data from Study 4 are unable to provide additional 
support for these hypotheses, it is possibly because of the nature of the transgression that 
was presented to participants and not due to an inhere t flaw in the theory. 
Implications, Limitations and Future Directions 
This research has implications for understanding the NFC and its effects on 
socially-relevant behavior. The present results show that low NFC individuals approach 
judgment formation differently than individuals hig in the NFC, consistent with prior 
research showing that they take more information into account when making decisions. 
This different approach can lead to more pro-social outcomes, as is the case in the present 
investigation with low (vs. high) NFC individuals engaging in more elaborative cognitive 
processing, desiring greater forgiveness, and desiring and engaging in less revenge.  
Specifically, low NFC is associated with open-mindedn ss which can include 
perspective taking (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994). As shown through the manipulation of 
perspective taking in Study 3, encouraging perspective taking can be accomplished with 
relatively quick and simple instructions. In fact, previous research has had much success 




Young, and Roan (2011) implemented a successful social perspective taking program to 
US Army personnel who often deal with individuals of other cultures. This program was 
taught over a period of 6 hours spread across two days and included several steps: a) 
assessing others’ biases, b) generating a large number of attributional hypotheses for the 
other’s behavior, and c) adapting hypotheses as new i formation arises. However, much 
shorter perspective taking training has also been successful. Galinsky et al. (2008) found 
that even taking a few minutes to engage in another’s p rspective while preparing to 
negotiate with him/her lead to enhanced individual and joint outcomes. These two 
perspective taking inductions are only a small sample of the available successful 
perspective taking instructions and programs (e.g., Batanova & Loukas, 2011; Galinsky 
& Moscowitz, 2000; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011; Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & 
Galinsky, 2011). Thus, perspective taking is a fast and easy method to improve social 
relations as it can reduce biases, aggression, and pu ishment, as well as improve 
negotiation outcomes.  
In the current investigation, the perspective taking manipulation included three 
prompts: to consider (1) how you would have acted as the Delegator in Round 1, (2) what 
you believe he/she was thinking and feeling when alloc ting the coins, and (3) how you 
believe he/she came up with the decision to allocate the coins. Although this type of 
manipulation has been used successfully in previous research (Galinsky et al., 2008), it is 
unclear if one prompt may have driven the effect more strongly than the other cues. It 
may be that different prompts have varying effects on individuals high (vs. low) in the 
NFC. Specifically, since high (vs. low) NFC individuals are more likely to be self-




may be more likely to focus on the cue asking how one would have acted in the 
Delegator role rather than the prompts that require understanding the other individual’s 
thoughts and feelings. Future research may gain understanding of the multifaceted nature 
of perspective taking and its relationship with the NFC by investigating each of the 
perspective taking prompts listed above in separate exp rimental conditions. This design 
would allow researchers to test the potential differential efficacy of each aspect of 
perspective taking as well as how each may vary as a function of the NFC.   
The aforementioned perspective taking studies measur d the benefits of 
perspective taking only a short while after the manipulation. Future research should be 
conducted to examine how long the effects of perspective taking inductions last and 
should work toward creating an induction that continues in the long-term. Along these 
lines, future research may also profit from a more thorough understanding regarding the 
encouragement of open- (vs. closed-mindedness). The pres nt study did not examine the 
duration of the impacts of the NFC manipulations and so it is unknown if such a simple 
and brief task would have effects outside of the labor tory.  
A possible limitation of the current studies is that the NFC was induced only 
through a motivational manipulation by instructing participants to recall times when they 
had acted closed-mindedly, for the high NFC manipulation, or acted with an open mind, 
for the low NFC induction. However, the NFC is often situationally manipulated via 
cognitive resources and therefore it remains to be tested if resource depletion (i.e., high 
NFC induction) or resource replenishment (i.e., lowNFC manipulation) would produce 




in fact, there is already preliminary evidence that depleting resources does lead to greater 
revenge (DeWall et al., 2007). 
 Another general methodological limitation of Studies 3 and 4 is that the 
transgression experience manipulated through the dictator task was relatively minor and 
performed by an anonymous stranger; it was therefore likely a low-impact manipulation. 
While these studies included a manipulation check, which asked participants to rate how 
fairly they perceived their partner to have played, neither study included a question about 
the severity of the transgression. Thus although this methodology was strong enough to 
produce the expected results, the theory would benefit from support with stronger and 
more ecologically-valid manipulations. 
 An example of a manipulation that has greater ecological validity is one that 
includes a transgression by a friend, which could be done through a recall task of a 
previous wrongdoing or through an actual transgression committed by one friend to 
another in the laboratory. A key aspect of these manipulations is that they allow social 
and group norms to play a role in the extent to which an individual may seek revenge. 
The present studies are limited in that the role of norms was not measured or 
manipulated. As high (vs. low) NFC individuals are more likely to adhere to group norms 
as well as punish ingroup members who deviate from n rms (Kruglanski, Pierro, 
Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006), they may be more likely to revenge against an ingroup 
transgressor because s/he violated ingroup norms by committing the injustice against 
another ingroup member. Future research would gain reater understanding of revenge as 
it occurs in everyday life by employing these more ecologically-valid methods and 




A notable limitation of the current research is that it was unable to find support 
for the hypothesized accessibility mechanism that le ds high (vs. low) NFC individuals to 
desire greater revenge and engage in more retaliation. Neither accessibility hypothesis 
was supported and thus the seizing and freezing mechanism remains uncorroborated. 
Specifically, the results did not reveal any differences in accessibility of revenge between 
the transgression and no transgression conditions and further did not reveal any 
differences in the accessibility of revenge over time between high and low NFC 
individuals. However, Study 2 showed that low (vs. high) NFC individuals engage in 
additional cognitive processing after a transgression, including perspective taking and 
generation of attributions and Study 3 revealed that encouraging perspective taking 
reduces revenge in individuals high in the NFC to the level of those low in the NFC. Thus 
although the present research was unable to corroborate seizing and freezing on revenge 
as the mechanism for the NFC-revenge relationship, an alternative mechanism of 
perspective taking has preliminary support.  
Specifically, I argued that a transgression prompts the victim with the question of 
how they will react to a transgression and if they will accept future harm; this question is 
viewed as a lack of closure. Thus, individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC should be 
particularly motivated to respond to the injustice in some manner in order to achieve 
closure. They may “answer the question” with revenge or forgiveness and the current 
package of studies provides evidence that the extent of perspective taking determines 
how one will respond. In particular, the present research showed that high (vs. low) NFC 
individuals engaged in less perspective taking and generated fewer attributions for a 




when explicitly encouraged to engage in perspective taking, high and low NFC 
individuals did not differ in the extent to which tey engaged in retaliation. Therefore, 
perspective taking is shown to be a possible mechanism that explains why high (vs. low) 
NFC individuals desire greater revenge and engage in more retributive behavior. Future 
research should investigate perspective taking as it influences low (vs. high) NFC 
individuals to refrain from revenge to bolster support that the extent of engaging in the 
transgressor’s perspective is the mechanism for the relationship between the NFC and 
revenge. 
 Another future direction indicated by the results of the current research package is 
a possible moderating variable: the ambiguity or cla ity of the transgression. Attribution 
of the wrong-doing seems to play an especially important role. For example, Study 1, 
which used a clear-cut transgression, showed that high NFC individuals desired revenge 
more than forgiveness whereas individuals low in the NFC did not differ in the extent to 
which they desired each. On the other hand, Study 2, which employed a transgression of 
ambiguous intent, revealed very different results. Specifically, all individuals in this 
study, regardless of their level of the NFC, had greater desires for forgiveness than 
revenge. It is possible that the specific transgression vignette used in Study 2 may have 
suggested alternative goals to participants, such as maintaining a friendship, which could 
have led to the findings that forgiveness was desired to a greater extent than revenge 
regardless of NFC. Future research would improve our understanding of whether an 
alternative relationship maintenance goal was present by having a transgression for which 




elimination of the possible alternative goal of friendship maintenance would produce 
results showing that revenge is desired more than forgiveness.  
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The current package of studies tested two major aspect  of my theory to explain 
the relationship between the NFC and revenge. The first aspect deals with the 
accessibility of response options to a transgression; it suggests that revenge is most 
accessible following a transgression and that high NFC individuals seize and freeze on 
vengeance to achieve closure. The results were unable to support this particular 
accessibility explanation. The second feature of my theory regards the additional 
cognitive processing undertaken by low (vs. high) NFC individuals. This greater 
cognitive processing may include perspective taking of the transgressor. The present 
research found support that greater cognitive processing, perspective taking, and open-
mindedness (vs. closed- mindedness) reduce desire for venge and lead to lesser 
retaliation behavior across three studies. This research is particularly important as it 
demonstrates a consistent positive relationship between the NFC and revenge, which has 
significant implications for interpersonal behavior and conflict resolution. The present 
research is also notable by showing that perspective taking can be easily induced and that 



















Kruglanski and Pierro’s (2008) short version of theNFC scale 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with each 
according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the 
following scale, using only one number for each statement. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree    4 – Slightly Agree 
2 – Moderately Disagree   5 – Moderately Agree 
3 – Slightly Disagree    6 – Strongly Agree 
 
1. In case of uncertainty, I prefer to make an immediat  decision whatever it may be. 
2. When I find myself facing various, potentially valid, alternatives, I decide in favor 
of one of them quickly and without hesitation. 
3. I have never been late for work or for an appointment. 
4. I prefer to decide on the first available solution rather than to ponder at length 
what decision I should make. 
5. I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place. 
6. Generally, I avoid participating in discussions on ambiguous and controversial 
problems. 
7. When I need to confront a problem, I do not think about it too much and I decide 
without hesitation. 
8. When I need to solve a problem, I generally do not waste time in considering 
diverse points of view about it. 
9. I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as myself. 
10. Generally, I do not search for alternative solutions to problems for which I already 
have a solution available. 
11. I feel uncomfortable when I do not manage to give a quick response to problems 
that I face. 
12. I have never hurt another person’s feelings. 
13. Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state of uncertainty. 
14. I prefer activities where it is always clear what is o be done and how it needs to 
be done. 
15. After having found a solution to a problem I believe that it is a useless waste of 
time to take into account diverse possible solutions. 















Transgression Vignette used in Study 1 
 
“You are a student at a large regional university. You enjoy classes and have a job 
at a local restaurant. Last week, you saw an information sheet posted on the bulletin 
board describing a scholarship, titled Scholarship A, for which you are eligible. After 
reading the scholarship description, you decide you are very interested in it. It requires an 
essay and after working several hours on the application and essay, you submit your 
resume and essay for review.  
 While talking to a fellow student, you learn that e has applied for Scholarship B, 
a scholarship which includes slightly more money than Scholarship A. He explains that 
he is not interested in Scholarship A and that he is very confident about getting 
Scholarship B. You mention during the conversation hat you applied for Scholarship A, 
a point which surprises your acquaintance. He said he idn’t realize you were looking for 
scholarships and you explain that you have on-and-off and explain why you think you are 
qualified. In your excitement in thinking about the scholarship, you also tell him some of 
the main points of your essay. 
 When you have your phone interview for the scholarship, you feel that it goes 
well. You provide thoughtful answers to the questions and some creative ideas for how 
you can help advertise for the scholarship at your school next year. The interviewer is 
somewhat quiet during your answers and you attribute this to surprise at the creativity of 
them. At the end of the interview, the interviewer says that you’ll be hearing about their 
decision in a week or so. You hang up the phone feeling confident.  
 A few days later, you get a call from the interviewer who says that they chose 
someone else for the scholarship. You are upset by this news and find out from a friend 
that the person chosen for the scholarship is the fellow student who had said he was 
applying only for Scholarship B. You find out that he had a phone interview for 























Neutral Vignette used in Study 1 
 
“You are a student at a large regional university. You enjoy classes and have a job 
at a local restaurant. Last week, you saw an information sheet posted on the bulletin 
board describing a scholarship, titled Scholarship A, for which you are eligible. After 
reading the scholarship description, you decide you are very interested in it. It requires an 
essay and after working several hours on the application and essay, you submit your 
resume and essay for review.  
 While talking to a fellow student, you learn that e has applied for Scholarship B, 
a scholarship which includes slightly more money than Scholarship A. He explains that 
he is not interested in Scholarship A and that he is very confident about getting 
Scholarship B. You mention during the conversation hat you applied for Scholarship A, 
a point which surprises your acquaintance. He said he idn’t realize you were looking for 
scholarships and you explain that you have on-and-off and explain why you think you are 
qualified. In your excitement in thinking about the scholarship, you also tell him some of 
the main points of your essay. 
 When you have your phone interview for the scholarship, you feel that it goes 
well. You provide thoughtful answers to the questions and some creative ideas for how 
you can help advertise for the scholarship at your school next year. The interviewer is 
somewhat quiet during your answers and you attribute this to surprise at the creativity of 
them. At the end of the interview, the interviewer says that you’ll be hearing about their 
decision in a week or so. You hang up the phone feeling confident.  
 A few days later, you get a call from the interviewer who says that you are a 
finalist Scholarship A and that you will hear the final decision in about two weeks. You 

























Revenge, forgiveness, neutral and non words used in response latency task in Study 1 
 















































Transgression Vignette used in Study 2 
 
“You and a friend have been close friends for quite some time. You frequently 
drive to school together, meet each other for meals, and hang out on the weekends. You 
also signed up for some of the same classes this semest r and therefore occasionally do 
homework together. If you were to list your top three closest friends at school, this person 
would definitely be on the list, if not in the top s ot. 
            The two of you get word that a very bigparty is happening tonight and are very 
excited to go even though it is pretty far away. You are acquaintances with the host of the 
party, having only met them once briefly in the hallw y; however, your friend knows 
them better. You and your friend have a strict ‘no ditching each other’ policy that you 
guys are very good at following. When you get to the party, you see a mutual friend and 
while talking to them, your friend sees someone they want to talk to and goes over there. 
A few hours later you realize that you haven’t seen your friend in a while. You know they 
must still be at the party because you had already planned on going back to the dorms 
together. 
            You see your mutual friend again and ask if they have seen the friend you came 
with. They reply that your friend left about 45 minutes earlier with some people. You call 
your friend’s cell phone to find out if they are coming back but get their voicemail. You 






























NFC manipulation used in Study 4 
 




1. …in a social conflict, you could easily see which side was right and which was 
wrong. 
2. … you quickly became impatient and irritated when you did not find a solution to 
a problem immediately 
3. …you felt uncomfortable when you didn’t understand the reason why an event 
occurred in your life. 
4. …you didn’t like to be with people who were capable of unexpected actions 





1. …in a social conflict, you can see how both sides could be right. 
2. …you would rather sleep on a decision rather than find a solution to a problem 
immediately. 
3. …you felt comfortable even though you didn’t understand the reason why an 
event occurred in your life. 
4. …you enjoyed being with people who were capable of unexpected actions 
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